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ABSTRACT 
Freedom of expression and especially freedom of the press are essential elements of a 
democratic society. Should this freedom extend to giving journalists a privilege against revealing their 
sources? 
The premise of this paper is that it is important that journalists are able to foster relationships 
of confidence with their sources and that compelling disclosure by journalists should be avoided if 
possible. However, the central claim of the paper is that specific statutory protections have not proven 
to be particularly effective or reliable forms of protection. 
This paper first looks at the principles behind a journalist's privilege and its correlation to the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA). 
This paper then looks at the development of the idea that journalists should be able to protect 
the identities of their sources and the arguments both for and against allowing journalists a privilege 
against disclosure. It looks at some of the situations in which the issue has been considered, touching 
on the different approaches taken in New Zealand and in other jurisdictions and the factors considered 
in deciding whether to compel a journalist to disclose his or her source. The paper then looks at the 
problems of scope and definition that must be resolved to establish a workable statutory journalist's 
privilege. 
The paper concludes that, in the long run, a statutory qualified privilege may not be the best 
option. While there should be a fundamental presumption that a journalist should not have to reveal his 
or her source, the courts should have a broad discretion, balancing all relevant considerations 
pertaining to whether it is in the interests of justice to excuse a journalist from revealing a source. 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bibliography and 
appendices) comprises approximately 14,920 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
It came as no surprise to journalists in New Zealand when it was announced in 
2000 that former Police Commissioner Peter Doone was commencing defamation 
proceedings against the Sunday Star Times. Commissioner Doone had been a 
passenger in a vehicle stopped at night by a young police officer. The paper reported 
that when the officer approached the car with a breath-test ' sniffer', Commissioner 
Doone allegedly said, "That won't be necessary". Media eyebrows were raised, 
however, when the newspaper's publisher, Fairfax New Zealand, revealed that one of 
its sources for the story was Prime Minister Rt Hon Helen Clark. 1 Many saw this as a 
transgression of a cardinal rule of journalism that a journalist never reveals his or her 
sources. 
While the unimaginatively-named "Doonegate" saga was making headlines in 
New Zealand,2 United States journalist Judith Miller was unsuccessfully fighting 
contempt charges for refusing to reveal to a Grand Jury her confidential sources for a 
story she had never actually written.3 
Protection of journalists ' sources is one of the most fundamental tenets of the 
journalists ' code of ethics.4 However, at law, when a source gives information to a 
journalist, to what extent can he or she rely on that journalist to keep any confidences 
revealed? And what is the legal force of a journalist's refusal to disclose information 
about a source? 
New Zealand courts have seldom had to deal with the issue, but when they 
have, it has been done with considerable regard to the importance of free speech and 
freedom of the press. Furthermore, statutory provisions in other jurisdictions affording 
1 
" Ethical Issues For Politicians And The Press" (21 May 2005), The Dominion Post Wellington 9. 
2 
Andrew Geddis " Why Doonegate isn't Watergate" ( 16 May 2005) New Zealand Herald Auckland 
A6 . 
3 
Miller v United States (2005) 125 S Ct 2977 . In 2003 journalist Robert Novak published a column 
exposing Valerie Plame as a covert CIA operative. Judith Miller refused to disclose to a Grand Jury the 
names of administration sources she had talked to while researching the same story. The prosecution 
team was trying to establish whether Novak ' s source had violated the Intelligence Identities Protection 
Act of 1982. One judge denied the existence of any common law privilege, the second saw no need to 
consider it in the circumstances and the third said privilege was relevant but the prosecution case 
overrode it. All three voted for her to be jailed for contempt. Miller spent 85 days in jail before her 
release on 29 September 2005. 
4 
fn New Zealand, the principle is found in the Rules of the New Zealand Amalgamated Engineering 
Printing & Manufacturing Union Part VI : Finance And Administration R42 Journalist Code of Ethics 
(c) [EPMU Rules]. 
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a privilege to journalists to protect their sources have been interpreted inconsistently 
and have proved to have a limited effect. Despite moves to enact such a privilege in 
New Zealand, journalists are unlikely ever to be able to guarantee to their sources the 
same degree of confidentiality as that between lawyers and their clients. 
II SCOPE OF THE PAPER 
A Issues 
This paper looks at common law, equitable and statutory fonns of protection 
for journalists ' sources in New Zealand and in other jurisdictions. It looks at forms of 
protection such as the newspaper rule, qualified privilege and absolute privilege. It 
does not deal specifically with protection for whistleblowers,
5 or with the sources 
themselves, but focuses on the protection afforded to the press on their behalf. 
At the start, this paper looks at the principles behind a journalist's privilege 
and its correlation to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA). 
This paper then looks at the development of the idea that journalists should be 
able to protect the identities of their sources and the arguments both for and against 
allowing journalists a privilege against disclosure . It looks at some of the situations in 
which the issue has been considered, touching on the different approaches taken in 
New Zealand and in other jurisdictions and the factors considered in deciding whether 
to compel a journalist to disclose his or her source. 
In New Zealand, a new Evidence Bill which contains a clause g1vmg 
journalists a qualified form of privilege is currently at the select committee stage.6 
This paper looks at the problems of scope and definition that would have to be 
resolved to create a workable statutory journalist's privilege. 
B Terminology 
The terms journalist's privilege, reporter' s privilege, newsman's or 
newsgatherer' s privilege are used more or less interchangeably in the literature on this 
subject. This paper refers to the common law or statutory principle that a journalist 
will not be required to reveal his or her confidential sources as "journalist' s 
5 Legitimate whistleblowers (employees who disclose wrongdoing within an organisation) are 
protected under the Protected Disclosures Act 2000. 
6 Evidence Bill 2005 no 256-1 . 
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privilege". Journalist ' s privilege has been described as the right to refuse to disclose 
admissible evidence including oral answers and the production of documents.7 
However, where it exists, the journalist's privilege is usually a qualified one, 
unlike other privileges such as legal professional privilege. It is essentially a ' default ' 
rule, and other countervailing issues are taken into consideration. 
The term ' absolute journalist' s privilege ' is used when referring to an absolute 
privilege. 
III FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
A Fundamental Democratic Principle 
Protection of journalists ' sources is a basic component of press freedom . 
Freedom of expression and especially freedom of the press are essential elements of a 
democratic society. The press is the 'Fourth Estate ', playing a unique and pivotal role 
in a democratic society. It is the public watchdog, keeping guard over citizens ' right 
to be informed and seeking always to uncover the truth. 
Some commentators believe that the need for journalists to have firm 
protection against forced disclosure of information is more urgent today than ever 
before. In an international climate of fear about terrorism, governments are eager to 
tighten security but should not erode civil liberties at the same time. 8 Any curb on 
press freedom and independence leaves open the possibility for the state to exert 
control over the information that its citizens are delivered. 
B Access to Information 
Sources enable journalists to acquire information they would not otherwise be 
able to access and disseminate. Thus they enable more thorough enquiries into issues 
of public debate. For example, confidential sources were used in the investigations 
into ill-treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and into the Enron scandal in the United 
7 Sally Walker "Compelling Journali sts to Identify Their Sources: 'The Newspaper Rule ' and 
'Necessity ' (1991) 14 UNSWLJ 302,304 (footnote in original) . 
8 Jennifer Elrod " Protecting Journalists from Compelled Disclosure: A Proposal for a Federal Statute" 
(2003-2004) 7 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol ' y 115, 122. 
9 
States.9 Withholding information about the identity of a source is seen as a small price 
to pay alongside the wider benefits to the free flow of information.
10 
Oliver Wendell Holmes believed in the value and power of information to 
benefit a democracy: 11 
The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ... the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market ... truth is the only ground upon which 
[people's] wishes safely can be carried out. 
In order to achieve that truth-seeking aim, "debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust and wide open." 12 
Often a source is in a position where, if his or her identity is revealed, he or 
she will likely suffer some form of retribution, or even be put in physical danger. 
Traditionally, arguments for protection in law enabling a journalist to keep secret the 
identity of a confidential source have been based on the principle that if journalists 
cannot keep promises of confidentiality, sources would dry up. This would result not 
only in less news overall, but also the quality of the news that journalists are able to 
deliver would be diminished. 
The House of Lords has recognised the concern that sources may dry up and 
that important information may never be disseminated if journalists cannot keep 
promises of confidentiality to their sources. 13 Lord Woolf explained: 14 
Any disclosure of journalists' sources does have a chilling effect on 
freedom of the press ... the fact is that information which should be placed 
in the public domain is frequently made available to the press by 
individuals who would lack the courage to provide the information if they 
thought there was a risk of their identity being disclosed. The fact that 
journalists' sources can be reasonably confident that their identity will not 
be disclosed makes a significant contribution to the ability of the press to 
perform their role in society of making information available to the public. 
9 Laura J Handman "Protection of Confidential Sources: A Moral , Legal and Civic Duty" (2005) 19 
Notre Dame J L Ethics and Pub Pol 'y 573 , 576. 
10 This policy argument is similar to the policy behind s9(2)(ba) of the Official Information Act 1982 
regarding sources of official information. 
11 Abrams v United States ( 1919) 250 US 616, 630. 
12 New York Times v Sullivan ( 1964) 376 US 254, 270. 
13 Ashworth Security Hospital v MGN Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 193. 
14 Ashworth Security Hospital v MGN Ltd, above n 13 ,2 10. 
10 
Along with the House of Lords, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has 
acknowledged that compelling journalists to deliver up material to authorities might 
pose a threat to their continued access to confidential information. In relation to the 
issuing of warrants against news media organisations, it said "warrants should rarely 
be granted if doing so would result in a ' substantial risk ' that confidential sources 
I -
would dry up." ' 
C New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
I SecNon 1../ 
Section 14 of the BORA affirms that "everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and 
opinions of any kind in any form." 16 The Court of Appeal has given the section 14 
freedom a broad interpretation: it is "as wide as human thought and imagination." 17 
Cooke P affirmed that the freedom of the press " is an important adjunct of the rights 
concerning freedom of expression affirmed in [section] 14 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act". 18 Confidential information clearly fits under the description of 
information "of any kind" and the identity of a source can be seen as information " in 
any form" . 
Conflicting BORA rights come into play when looking at a journalist' s ability 
to maintain confidentiality. The first is the right of the journalist both to receive and 
impart the information acquired from a confidential source (since forcing disclosure 
may restrict the journalist' s ability to receive similar information in the future). 
Secondly, there are the rights of others (such as a litigant seeking evidence) to receive 
information about that confidential source. In addition, the source has a right to 
express himself or herself in confidence. 
However, the New Zealand Law Commission (Law Commission) has long 
believed that there is a good case for according a journalist's privilege to confidential 
15 Television New Zealand Ltd v Attorney-General [ 1995) 2 NZLR 641 , 647-8. 
16 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s 14. 
17 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 15 . 
18 Television New Zealand Ltd v Attorney-General, above n 15, 646. 
II 
sources of information based on the specific protection given to freedom of 
expression in section 14. 19 
2 Section 5 
Under section 5 of the BORA, section 14 rights are made subject to "such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society."20 The breadth of the interpretation of freedom of expression in 
section 14 is matched by a generosity of interpretation regarding what can be 
considered a justified limitation on those rights:2' 
The protection afforded by the right will vary in different contexts along 
with the nature of the expression ... In general , the further that expression 
is from what are considered the ' core ' values of the right, the greater will 
be the ability to justify the establishment of limits upon it. 
Press freedom is generally regarded as a core democratic value. Cooke P has 
stressed the need for "restraint and careful scrutiny" where press freedom is 
involved.22 Moreover, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has also recognised that 
there is "a legitimate public interest in protecting media sources from unnecessary 
revelation. "23 
However, the principle that no-one is immune when information is demanded 
in the interests of the efficient administration of justice dates back a long time :24 
Are men of the first rank and consideration - are men in high office - men 
whose time is not less valuable to the public than to themselves - are such 
men to be forced to quit their business, their functions , and what is more 
than all , their pleasure, at the beck of every idle or malicious adversary, to 
dance attendance upon every petty cause? Yes, as far as it is necessary, 
they and everybody .. . Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, and the Lord High Chancellor, to be passing by in the same 
coach, while a chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman were in dispute 
about a halfpennyworth of apples, and the chimney-sweeper or the 
19 New Zealand Law Commission Evidence law: A Discussion Paper (NZLC PP23, Wellington, 1994) 
111 ["Evidence law: A Discussion Paper "] . 
20 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s 5. 
21 Paul Rishworth , Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican and Richard Mahoney The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003) 312. 
22 Television New Zealand Ltd v Attorney-General, above n 15 , 646 . 
23 European Pacific Banking Corporation Ltd v Television New Zealand [ 1994] 3 NZLR 43 , 48. 
24 J Bowring (ed) -I The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Tait, Edinburgh, 1843) 320-321. 
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barrow-woman were to think proper to call upon them for their evidence, 
could they refuse it? No, most certainly. 
3 Section 25 
The balancing of section 14 rights against another's BORA rights is especially 
noticeable in the case of criminal investigations or litigation, where a party may 
believe the information held by a journalist is necessary or useful for its case.25 The 
public interest in permitting non-disclosure by the journalist will then be stacked up 
against a defendant ' s section 25 rights to a fair trial and it is generally held that 
"litigants cannot be restrained by the private codes of strangers."26 Despite the press ' s 
unique position in society, when an individual ' s liberty is at stake, compelled 
disclosure is more likely to be considered a justifiable limitation on press freedom. 
-I Sections 6 and 7 
Parliament retains the power under the BORA, however, to pass legislation 
that overrides a BORA right. Inevitably, unless there is a clear statutory privilege 
against disclosure, if a judge determines that information about a confidential source 
is admissible and sufficiently relevant to a case, he or she will find compelled 
disclosure to be a reasonable limit on a journalist' s right to maintain confidentiality. 
IV EVOLUTION OF THE THEORY OF PROTECTION FOR 
JOURNALISTS' SOURCES 
An early form of privilege was recognised as far back as 1 ih century England, 
when obligations of honour sometimes protected gentlemen against having to disclose 
information obtained in exchange for a promise of confidence. 27 
It appears that the first reported case where journalist's privilege was claimed 
in the United States was Ex parte Nugent, a case involving a secret Mexican war 
treaty. 28 Information was passed to Nugent who was subpoenaed and subsequently 
jailed for contempt after refusing to disclose his source. 
25 For example, see R v Cara and Kelman (2004) 2 1 CRNZ 283 , para 34 Potter J. 
26 Re Buchanan [1964-1965] NSWR 1379, 1381. 
27 Bulstrod v Letchmere ( 1676) 22 ER 1019; Lord Grey 's Trial ( 1682) 9 How Str 127. 
28 Ex pa rte Nugent ( 1848) 18 F Cas 4 71 (DC Cir). 
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Calls for a journalist's privilege in United States law arose during the Great 
Depression, as stories about government corruption and labour unrest increased. 
There were already a few states which had enacted "shield laws" by this time. The 
wording of these laws and the degree of protection afforded varied from state to state, 
but they all gave some statutory protection to journalists not to have to reveal their 
sources in the course oflegal proceedings.29 
However shield laws largely proved to be insufficient in the scope of their 
protection. Most of the statutes were hastily drafted and had been passed ad hoe to 
deal with a local dispute. Consequently, courts generally construed them very 
narrowly. This led to journalists relying more on First Amendment claims, to varying 
degrees of success. 30 
Current trends m pnvacy law recognise that there is a value in protecting 
privacy in some circumstances.31 The relationship between the journalist and the 
source is a private one notwithstanding the assumption that the information conveyed 
may be intended for publication. 
V JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE 
A Absolute Privilege 
An absolute journalist' s privilege enables a journalist to maintain 
confidentiality in all circumstances in the same way that legal professional privilege 
operates to prevent disclosure of communications between a solicitor and his or her 
client. The Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 provides that doctors, lawyers, 
patent attorneys and ministers of religion do not have to answer questions without the 
source ' s consent. 32 Very few jurisdictions have enacted such a sweeping protection 
29 
A typical example of a shield law is that in Kentucky State law. Ky Rev Stat § 421 . 100 ( 1962) 
provides that: "No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial before any 
court, or before any grand jury or pet it jury, or before the presiding officer of any tribunal, or his agent 
or agents, or before the General Assembly, or any committee thereof, or before any city or county 
legislative body, or any committee thereof, or elsewhere, the source of any information procured or 
obtained by him, and published in a newspaper or by a radio or television broadcasting station by 
which he is engaged or employed, or with which he is connected." 
30 
Robert T Sherwin "'Source ' of Protection : The Status of the Reporter ' s Privilege in Texas and a Call 
to Arms for the State ' s Legislators and Journalists" (2000-200 I) 32 Tex Tech L Rev 13 7, 143. 
31 
For example, the confirmation by the Court of Appeal that a tort of invasion of privacy exists in New 
Zealand in Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR I . 
32 Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 ss 31-34 . 
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for journalists.33 The Law Commission believes that an absolute privilege against 
disclosure is "not an attractive solution",34 and that "there appears to be no room for 
any 'absolute' privilege which would prevent the courts from looking into individual 
cases to see whether privilege is justified."35 
B Qualified Privilege 
A qualified privilege stems from the principle that a journalist should have a 
fundamental right to keep the identity of a source confidential. However, that right 
may be outweighed by a countervailing right that makes disclosure necessary. 
Possible reasons for overriding confidentiality include wrongdoing by the journalist, 
to prevent a crime being perpetrated or because it is in the interests of justice 
generally. The information demanded can go beyond merely identifying the source. 
For example, a journalist who receives information about the commission of a crime 
may be required to give evidence in court even if it means exposing the identity of the 
informant. 
If a New Zealand court or tribunal requires a journalist to answer a question, 
the journalist must do so or risk being held in contempt.36 In New Zealand, there is no 
specific statutory or common law protection for a journalist's confidential source 
when a court requests information.37 However the court may use its discretion and 
decide not to make a journalist answer a question regarding his or her sources of 
information. 
C Arguments For a Journalist's Privilege 
I Future relationships 
Parallels can be drawn between the journalist-source relationship and the 
government-informer relationship. In both cases, the source is likely to be seeking 
protection from retaliation for disclosing the information. The confidant has an 
obvious interest in retaining the source's usefulness for the future. A firm promise of 
confidentiality can give comfort and assurance to fearful sources. 
33 The press have an absolute privilege against disclosure of confidential sources in Austria. States in 
the United States with shield laws affording an absolute privilege include Alabama and Pennsylvania. 
34 "Evidence law: A Discussion Paper ", above n 19, 113 . 
35 "Evidence law: A Discussion Paper ", above n 19, 111. 
36 John F Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media law in New Zealand (5ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 2005) 426 . 
37 Although see High Court Rules, r 285, which relates to the newspaper rule. 
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There is a danger that without an assurance that confidentiality will be 
maintained, others will be discouraged from informing. Journalists rely on informants 
to report important and ground-breaking stories and many sources wish to remain 
confidential. It follows that if confidentiality is not honoured, those sources are likely 
to dry up. As Lord Denning put it; "Wrongdoing would not be disclosed. Charlatans 
would not be exposed. Unfairness would go umemedied. Misdeeds in the corridors of 
. . . d ld b kn "38 power, m compames or m government epartments wou never e own. 
2 Independence 
Compelling journalists to give evidence about their sources threatens 
journalistic independence. It undermines the media' s democratic function and 
threatens people ' s democratic right to receive information. Litigants may use 
subpoenas strategically to harass journalists or to prevent further investigation into an 
issue. The time journalists spend complying with or fighting subpoenas is time taken 
away from doing valuable press work. 39 
Journalists frequently rely on confidential sources for stories that are 
controversial, dangerous or that expose wrongdoing in high places; "Deep Throat" 
and the Watergate scandal is the most noted example of this . But journalists ' work 
should not be exploited as an investigatory tool for the criminal justice system. There 
is a danger that if litigants are routinely allowed access to information held by 
journalists, they will be encouraged to embark on "fishing expeditions" - looking for 
suable parties or seeking information with which to bolster a case.40 
3 Chilling effect 
Journalists make compelling witnesses; they are knowledgeable and articulate, 
and they keep meticulous records. However, it is unfair for investigators and litigants 
to take advantage of the journalist's knowledge and labour rather than do the hard 
work themselves. Indeed, this phenomenon may contribute to a chilling effect through 
journalists not covering stories that are likely to lead to court orders for information. 
38 British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [198 l] A.C. I 096, 1129 (HL) . 
39 Lucy A Dalglish ·'Agents of Discovery: A Report on the Incidence of Subpoenas Served on the 
News Media in 2001 " (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Virginia 2003) 13 . ~ - ' Dalglish , above n 39, 14. 
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Many news organisations in the United States now discourage reporters from 
producing articles based on material provided by uncited sources.4 1 
It can be argued that without immunity against compelled disclosure, 
journalists would either be severely limited in the information they were able to 
provide or they would be forced to rely on information from sources anonymous even 
to them.42 In the latter case, it would then become very difficult for the journalist to 
guarantee the authenticity of any information received in this way and may lead to a 
proliferation of false or inaccurate information.43 
Exacerbating this chilling effect is the inevitable corollary that journalists who 
are fair game for any party seeking information will start to self-censor their work so 
as to avoid being called on. Not only press freedom, but also the level of information 
disseminated would be severely compromised. 
-I Checks and balances 
A major argument for granting a privilege is the press ' s democratic 
responsibility for providing a check on official use of power.44 Journalists often rely 
on confidential sources in situations where the source is revealing criminal activity or 
corruption, such as the Watergate scandal. Yet " if employee confidentiality were to 
trump conscience, there would be a licence for corporations, governments and other 
employers to operate without accountability. "45 
D Arguments Against a Journalist's Privilege 
I Civic duty 
Some believe that the public interest in the administration of justice is of 
primary importance and outweighs the rights of individual citizens. It is every 
citizen' s duty to give evidence when called upon and this should take precedence over 
any journalist ' s privilege. A privilege attaching to media sources would advance 
different interests, and might ultimately hinder effective law enforcement, by barring 
disclosure of information which is required for full police or judicial inquiry into 
41 Dalglish, above n 39, 12. 
42 Handman, above n 9, 587-588. 
43 Vincent Blasi The Newsman 's Privilege: An Empirical Study" ( 1971) 70 Mich L Rev 229, 246 . 
44 Julie M Zampa "Journalist's Privilege: When Deprivation is a Benefit" (1999) 108 Yale LJ 1449, 
1449. 
45 R v National Post [2004] 69 OR (3d) 427, 441 . 
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alleged crimes. Furthermore, the statutory protections recently enacted for legitimate 
whistle blowers may have diminished the need for a journalist's privilege. 
2 Competing rights 
Granting a privilege to journalists may m tum deprive an accused of 
information relevant to proving innocence. If it is the journalist's work that has 
brought the accused to court in the first place, that accused surely has the right to 
confront his or her accuser.46 In this situation, it is argued, freedom of expression is 
enhanced more by compelling the journalist to disclose. And by accepting a fine for 
deliberate contempt, journalists could be seen as placing themselves above the law.47 
The United States Supreme Court has remarked that the press has flourished 
without such a sweeping protection, with no signs of a chilling effect on the amount 
of information imparted.48 
3 Lack of regulation 
Should journalists be entitled to the same protection as lawyers and doctors, 
who are trained and certified professionals with fiduciary duties? Journalists may or 
may not receive training and they are not part of a regulated profession, nor are they 
licensed. 
Indeed, journalists are largely opposed to such regulation on the grounds that 
it impinges on their independence. The confidentiality privilege afforded to other 
professions is a reflection of the high standards of conduct imposed by that regulation. 
By contrasts, there is a view that: "journalists make a fetish of anonymous sources. 
They do so for reasons ethical, psychological, and anthropological, including genuine 
principle, the lure of heroism, and . .. a culture of status based on access to inside 
information. "49 
-I Responsibility 
46 Robert Zelnick "Journalists and Confidential Sources" (2005) 19 Notre Dame JL Ethics and Pub 
Pol 'y 541 , 55 I. 
47 
TRS Allan " Disclosure of Journalists ' Sources, Civil Disobedience and the Rule of Law ( 1991) 50 
CLJ 131 , 138. 
48 Bran=burg v Hayes ( 1972) 408 US 665 , 698-699 . 
49 Jacob Weisberg "The Anonymity Trap: Norm Pearlstine Didn't Go Far Enough" (2005) 
<http: //www.slate.com/id/2 I 22509/> (last accessed 30 September 2005). 
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Some argue that the possibility of compulsory disclosure of sources acts as an 
important check on the power of the media and journalists.50 A privilege against 
disclosure would give journalists carte blanche to sensationalise stories, conceal 
transgressions by their sources and aggrandise criminals. Furthermore, when 
politicians speak to journalists confidentially simply to avoid being held responsible 
for their statements, then this is arguably subverting the accountability of 
government. 51 
Journalists may simply become reckless in their reporting because they are not 
held responsible - granting a privilege may open the floodgates for abuse by both 
sources and journalists on the basis that if protection is guaranteed, a journalist may 
be less than scrupulous in his or her endeavours to verify the authenticity of 
information received.52 
The unidentified source has been likened to a ticking "time-bomb."53 For 
example, former United States Army scientist Steven Hatfill is currently suing 
government officials over public statements and private leaks that pointed to Hatfill as 
a "person of interest" in the 2001 investigation of anthrax-laced letters that killed five 
people and injured seventeen. Hatfill's reputation and career were ruined because 
false information was leaked to the press and there was strong suspicion that the 
reporters were "willing accomplices of government agents with axes to grind."54 Also 
in the United States, government sources gave erroneous information to journalists 
falsely accusing scientist Wen Ho Lee of passing nuclear secrets to China in 1999. 
The New York Times did an extensive review of his case, conceding that Lee had 
been the victim of some "unduly incredulous reporting."55 
Inevitably, some journalists will betray or at least fall short of the ethical 
standards demanded of them, collude with criminals or shelter terrorists. Ultimately 
this behaviour could cause public distrust in the administration of justice. 
so Georgia Price "Pack Your Toothbrush! Journalists, Confidential Sources and Contempt Of Court" 
(2003) 8(4) MALR 259. 
51 Chris Nash "Freedom of the Press in Australia" <http: //democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/Nashpaper.pdt> 
(last accessed 3 October 2005). 
52 "Evidence law: A Discussion Paper", above n 19, 110-111. 
53 Goodwin v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 123, 127. 
54 Cliff Kincaid ''No Media Shield Law" (2005) <http://www.aim.org/media_monitor/3658_0_2_0_C> 
(last accessed 30 September 2005). 
55 Zelnick, above n 46, 543. 
19 
E Form oftlte Privilege 
Some journalists themselves believe that, since freedom of the press is so 
crucial to the existence of a free nation, a journalist's privilege should be recognised 
as a constitutional right. Consequently, they object to a statutory privilege, believing 
that enacting laws to codify protection would only water down the right and make it 
subject to political whim and manipulation.56 
VI PROTECTION OF SOURCES AT LAW 
A court or tribunal may be interested in the identity of a journalist's informant 
m various circumstances: in the course of pre-trial, interlocutory and discovery 
process in a defamation suit against a media organisation; when the journalist is called 
to give evidence in court; or when there are specific legal rules establishing a 
procedure for uncovering the identity of a wrongdoer. 57 
A Pre-trial: The Newspaper Rule 
The common law newspaper rule shields a defendant who is part of the news 
media from being required at the interlocutory stage of proceedings to reveal the 
sources of its information. 
The scope of the rule is wide and the principle behind it suggests it should be 
generously construed.58 However, there are several limitations on the newspaper rule, 
and as the House of Lords has stated it is subject to exceptions that are themselves 
uncertain. 59 
The rule pertains only to the pre-trial stage, not to the trial itself, being applied 
as matter of course except in exceptional circumstances. However, the Court of 
Appeal has expressed some difficulty in imagining a circumstance in which it might 
not be found to apply.60 It is not entirely clear what publications come under the 
newspaper rule, although it has been held to include newspapers and television,61 and 
56 Sherwin, above n 30, 182. 
57 Walker, above n 7, 303-4. 
58 
European Pacific Banking Corporation v Fourth Estate Publications Ltd ( 1992) 6 PRNZ 129, 136. 
59 
British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd, above n 38. See also John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v 
Cojuangco ( 1988) 82 ALR I. 
60 
Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Alex Harvey Industries Ltd [ 1980] 1 NZLR 163, 165. 
61 
See for example, lsbey v Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand (No 2) [ 1975] 2 NZLR 237, 
Brill v Television Service One [1976] I NZLR 683(includes television and radio); Broadcasting 
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notes and documents as well as names of sources are covered by the rule .62 Arguably, 
as a common law rule able to reflect new developments in society, it should also 
extend to forms of communication such as the Internet. There is also some doubt as to 
which proceedings it covers, and as to the kind of relationship the defendant must 
have to the publication to take advantage of the rule .63 
Rationales for the rule are uncertain too. For example, although the discovery 
process should not be used for fishing expeditions, the rule has been held to apply 
even when a plaintiff undertakes not to sue the source.64 And if it is so important not 
to make newspapers reveal sources, it seems illogical to limit it to the interlocutory 
stage. 
The New Zealand courts have considered the limitations of the newspaper 
rule. It has so far been extended from defamation to include slander of goods and 
malicious falsehood cases. 65 The basis of the rule is more than merely to stop a 
plaintiff from embarking on fishing expeditions; its starting point is the public interest 
in protecting the media' s sources of information to encourage the free flow of 
information to them.66 
Problems may arise if a media defendant wishes to claim both a qualified 
privilege for reporting about public figures under Lange and use the newspaper rule 
as well.67 Under Lange a plaintiff has the difficult task of proving misuse by the 
media defendant of the qualifying occasion, but if the defendant can avoid having to 
reveal information under the newspaper rule, then the plaintiff is doubly 
disadvantaged. 68 
In such cases, the press might have to sacrifice some privilege for the sake of 
not revealing sources: 69 
Corporation of New Zealand v A /ex Harvey Industries Ltd, above n 60 (not confined to news items). In 
Australia, see Sims v Wran [1984] I NSWLR 87 ( inc ludes te levi s ion) . 
62 Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Alex Harvey Industries Ltd, above n 60 . 
63 Walker, above n 7, 308 . 
64 Lyle-Samuels v Odhams Ltd [ 1920] I KB 135 . 
65 Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v A /ex Harvey Industries Ltd, above n 60 . Note also lsbey 
v Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand (No 2), above n 61 ; Brill v Television Service One, above 
n 61. 
66 Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Alex Harvey Industries Ltd, above n 60 . 
67 Tipping J "Journali stic Responsibility, Freedom of Speech and Protection of Reputation" (2002) I 0 
Waikato LR I. 
68 Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385 , 404 . 
69 Tipping J, above n 67, 11 . 
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The court could decide whether disclosure of sources was necessary to do 
justice in the particular case. If disclosure was ordered and the media 
defendant still remained unwilling to disclose, it could always avoid the 
need by withdrawing the plea of qualified privilege. 
The newspaper rule in New Zealand is arguably more generous than overseas 
equivalents. For example, the High Court of Australia has ruled that the 
administration of justice interest in securing a trial on the basis of relevant and 
admissible evidence is paramount and the role of the media cannot outweigh that. 70 
The newspaper rule is supplemented by Rule 285 of the High Court Rules: if 
the defendant pleads a defence of honest opinion or qualified privilege, then "no 
interrogatories as to the defendant's sources of information or grounds of belief will 
be allowed."71 This is not seen, however, as a codification of the newspaper rule,72 nor 
does it limit further development of the rule at common law. Understandably, the Law 
Commission view the newspaper rule as a rather messy and fragmented legal doctrine 
in need of clarification. 73 
B At Trial 
There is a general rule of evidence law in New Zealand that all relevant 
evidence is admissible and all witnesses who are able to give evidence are 
compellable. 74 
The questioning of journalists in court proceedings was discussed in Attorney-
General v Mulholland, where various conditions were specified: apart from the 
essential element that the question must be relevant, Lord Denning also required that 
any question should be "a proper and, indeed, necessary question in the course of 
justice to be put and answered."75 
70 John Fairfax & Sons Ltdv Cojuangco, above n 59. 
71 
High Court Rules, r 285. Compare, in England, RSC O 82, R6. 
72 Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Alex Harvey Industries Ltd, above n 60 .. 
73 "Evidence Law: A Discussion Paper", above n 19, 112. 
74 
There are a few exceptions to this rule. For example; under the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 
1980 section 29, a spouse is not currently compellable to give evidence against his or her spouse 
(although this provision will be repealed under the Evidence Bill). Legal professional privilege 
prevents a solicitor being able to reveal information conveyed to him or her by a client without the 
client's consent R v Derby Magistrates Court ex parte B [ 1996] AC 487. 
75 Allorney-General v Mulholland [ 1963] 2 QB 477, 489. 
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The New Zealand courts have recognised a common law discretion to excuse 
any witness from answering a question if the public interest in having the information 
withheld is greater than the public interest in disclosing it.76 
Statutory developments such as section 35 of the Evidence Amendment Act 
(No 2) 1980 (section 35) have led to a more flexible approach to privilege in 
New Zealand than existed previously. 77 However the Court of Appeal has affirmed 
the approach which should be taken at common law to a request for a new class 
privilege, particularly in a case involving journalistic confidences: 78 
The law was faced at a comparatively early stage of the growth of the rules of 
evidence with the question how to resolve the inevitable conflict between the 
necessity of discovering the truth in the interests of justice on the one hand 
and on the other the obligation of secrecy or confidence which an individual 
called upon to testify may in good faith have undertaken to a party or other 
person . Except in a few relations where paramount considerations of general 
policy appeared to require that there should be a special privilege, such as 
husband and wife, attorney and client, communications between jurors, the 
counsels of the Crown and State secrets, and , by statute, physician and patient 
and priest and penitent, an inflexible rule was established that no obligation 
of honour, no duties of non-disclosure arising from the nature of a pursuit or 
calling, could stand in the way of the imperative necessity of revealing the 
truth in the witness box. 
C Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 section 3579 
Section 35 gives the court a statutory discretion similar to the common law 
rule. The court may use its discretion to excuse any witness from answering a 
question or producing a document on the grounds that to do so would be a breach of 
confidence that, having regard to the special relationship between the witness and the 
source, the witness should not be compelled to breach. Each case should be 
considered on its own facts: 80 
The legislature has conferred a discretion on the Court to weigh the 
competing public interest bearing on each particular case, having regard to 
broad criteria. The section enables a witness to be excused ( on his own 
76 Mv L [1999] I NZLR 747, 760 (CA) Tipping J. 
77 M v L, above n 76 . 
78 McGuinness v Attorney-General ( 1940) 63 CLR 73 , I 02, cited in M v L, above n 77, 758 . 
79 See Appendix for full text of s 35 . 
80 R v Howse [ 1983] NZLR 246, 251 (CA) Cooke P. 
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application or that of a party) from disclosing confidences. It does not 
authorise a direction that he refrain from disclosure . 
In each case, the court must consider whether or not the public interest in 
having the evidence disclosed is outweighed by the public interest in the preservation 
of confidences between the confidant and the witness and the encouragement of free 
communication between such persons. As part of that balancing exercise, the court is 
to consider three factors: 
(a) the likely significance of the evidence to the resolution of the issues to be decided; 
(b) the nature of the confidence and of the special relationship between the confidant and the 
witness; and 
(c) the likely effect of the disclosure on the confidant or any other person. 
The "special relationship" between a confidant and a witness referred to m 
section 35 has been interpreted as being of a kind that would encourage the imparting 
of confidences and that has a public interest element in it. 81 The relationship may arise 
out of a duty reposed in the confidant or even merely by the imparting of the 
confidence itself. 
The Law Commission has long believed that the protection provided by 
section 35 is no longer adequate and needs reform.82 
VII NON-LEGAL PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS' SOURCES 
A Restraint 
There are several reasons why journalists are not often put in the position of 
being tested on their willingness to disclose the identity of sources: often the 
information may not be sufficiently relevant to litigation or investigations, the parties 
themselves may not press the matter, or if a government is involved it may not want 
to appear to be hounding the press. 83 
One United States media survey found that judges generally dislike suits 
against the media because such cases are high profile, expensive and time-
81 
R v Secord [ 1992] 3 NZLR 570, 574 (CA). The relationship in this case was between a probation 
officer and client. 
82 "Evidecne law: A Discussion Paper", above n 19, 114. 
83 Walker, above n 7,305. 
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consuming. 84 Nearly half of the survey respondents in states with shield laws said that 
they could usually avoid a subpoena simply by invoking the shield law and even 
casual reminders about the laws had prevented the issuance of some subpoenas. 85 One 
lawyer claimed that up until the Judith Miller case, media lawyers could make at least 
90 per cent of subpoenas seeking information about confidential sources ·'go away" 
with a simple letter asserting journalist's privilege.86 Many journalists find the mere 
existence of a shield law to be "immensely useful in prompting lawyers to withdraw 
subpoenas without a fight. "87 Oddly, though, a 2001 survey showed that news 
organisations in states with shield laws are almost twice as likely to be subpoenaed for 
information as those in states without. 88 
The public are generally aware of the principle that journalists will do their 
utmost to protect their sources and a former head of Australian Broadcasting 
Company legal department believes courts are generally reluctant to find journalists in 
contempt because of the public dissension it creates. 89 
B Industry Codes of Conduct 
I Press Council 
The New Zealand Press Council's Statement of Principles contains the 
following confidentiality clause:90 
Editors have a strong obligation to protect against disclosure of the 
identity of confidential sources. They also have a duty to take reasonable 
steps to satisfy themselves that such sources are well informed and that the 
information they provide is reliable. 
2 Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union (EPMU) 
84 Eileen M. Wirth "Shield Laws Deflect Subpoenas; Journalism Professors Study Finds They Protect 
Against the Increasing Barrage of Subpoenas" ( 1995) 128(22) E & P 16. 
85 Wirth, above n 84. 
86 Bill Kirtz " Reporter's Privilege: Could a Federal Shield Law be a Real Possibility?" (2005) 
<http ://www.poynter.org/content/content_ view.asp? id=8095 I> (last accessed 3 October 2005). 
87 Dalglish, above n 39, 11. 
88 Dalglish, above n 39, 11 . 
89 Vincent Morello " Australia ' s Bill of Writes" (2003) <http: //www.reportage .uts .edu .au> (last 
accessed 19 September 2005). 
90 New Zealand Press Council ·'Statement of Principles No 4: Confidentiality" 
<http://www.presscouncil.org.nz/> (last accessed 3 October 2005). 
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Unionised journalists in New Zealand are covered by the EPMU Code of 
Ethics: 91 
Respect for truth and the public's right to information are overriding 
principles for all journalists. . . All members of the Union engaged in 
gathering, transmitting, disseminating and commenting on news and 
information shall observe the following Code of Ethics in their 
professional activities: 
(c) in all circumstances they shall respect all confidences received in the 
course of their occupation. 
VIII LIMITATIONS ON PROTECTION OF SOURCES 
A Equity 
The House of Lords has on occasion invoked an equitable procedure designed 
to obtain information from a person not a party to the current litigation.92 This 
procedure will sometimes trump the newspaper rule because all the plaintiff seeks is 
sufficient information to be able to fire the leaker. Thus it is different from an 
ordinary defamation case (where success against the newspaper is as effective a 
remedy as success against the source).93 
B Rule 307 of the High Court Rule 
Under Rule 307 of the High Court Rules, if the court believes that any person 
has a document relevant to the proceedings, the Court may, unless the document is 
privileged from production, order that person to produce the document for inspection. 
C Crimes Act 1961 Section 389 
Section 389(a) of the Crimes Act 1961 empowers an appellate court, if it 
thinks it necessary or expedient in the interest of justice, to order the production of 
any document, exhibit, or other thing connected with the proceedings, if its 
production appears to the court to be necessary for the determination of the case.94 
This is a wide power, particularly since the information need only be "expedient" in 
the interest of justice and its production merely to "appear" to be necessary. 
91 EPMU Rules, above n 4. 
92 British Steel Corporation v Granada Television, above n 38. 
93 "Evidence law: A Discussion Paper", above n 19, 113. Compare the application of the newspaper 
rule in Australia; see XI Journalist's Privilege in Australia. 
94 See Appendix for full text ofs 389. 
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In general the evidence must be new or fresh in the sense that it was not 
available at the trial, relevantly credible and of a nature that, if given with the other 
evidence adduced, might reasonably have led the jury to return a different verdict.95 
D Contempt 
A journalist who refuses to disclose a source of information when required to 
do so by a court in the course of litigation is in contempt, and may be fined or 
imprisoned. 
Some say that by accepting a penalty for deliberate contempt, journalists are 
placing themselves above the law. 96 Should Judith Miller be given credit for accepting 
a penalty which is the inevitable outcome of her deliberate disobedience? It is difficult 
to argue that this would have no impact on the authority of the courts: 97 
Any widespread refusal to obey the orders of the court is a threat to the 
authority of the courts which is not any less such a threat, because it is 
coupled with an acceptance that there will be a penalty to be paid . 
A journalist who refuses to divulge sources will usually maintain that there is 
a wider public interest and benefit to society as a whole in withholding that 
information. However, it is arguable that Parliament is the proper forum for 
determining where the public interest lies. 
While it is true that deliberate flouting of the law should not be applauded, it 
should also be remembered that journalists usually have a moral as well as legal 
dilemma in this situation.98 
Civil disobedience can sometimes be justified on moral grounds rather than on 
the policy grounds of activating to change legislation.99 A journalist may have a 
stronger argument that because professional ethics require him or her to keep the 
secret, to reveal a source would be a breach of confidence. 100 This then gives rise to a 
much more complex balancing process for the court: the source in question must be 
considered as part of the balancing exercise but without being identified. 
95 Crime Appeal CA 60/88 ( 1988) 3 CRNZ 512, 513 Richardson J. 
96 Allan, above n 47, 142. 
97 X Ltd v Morgan Grampian (Publishers) Ltd [ 1990] 2 WLR 421 ,432 (CA). Lord Donaldson 
98 A journalist may also be held liable by the source for breach of confidence. See Cohen v Cowles 
Media Company ( 1991) 50 I US 663 . 
99 Ronald Dworkin A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1985) I 06-
113. 
100 Allan, above n 47, 139. 
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IX JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A The Principal Case - Branzburg v Hayes'0' 
I Background 
Society in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s was in a state of 
considerable upheaval. Freedom, individual rights, liberation, autonomy were all 
catch-cries of a liberal youth-focused socio-political movement. It was the time of the 
hippie movement, the Manson Family, black civil rights, the Vietnam War and a 
growing distrust of the government. The issue of journalist's privilege arose 
particularly in the context of media investigating anti-war & social activist groups. 102 
By the start of the 1970s, fewer than twenty states had enacted shield laws 
providing statutory protection for journalists from being compelled to testify in court 
as to their sources. At the same time, more subpoenas were being issued by courts. 103 
Journalists began claiming constitutional protection under the First Amendment. 
The Nixon administration's extensive use of media subpoenas led to open 
hostility between Nixon and the press and journalists fought more strongly for 
protection. 104 The conflict came to a head in the Supreme Court in 1972 with the case 
of Branzburg v Hayes (Branzburg). 
2 The facts 
Branzburg was actually four cases consolidated together. Two of the charges 
were against Paul Branzburg, a staff reporter for Louisville Kentucky's Courier-
Journal. In 1969, the paper published Branzburg's story about two individuals who 
earned up to $5,000 per week synthesising hashish from marijuana. The story 
mentioned their desire to remain anonymous and Branzburg promised to keep their 
identities confidential. A similar story was published in 1971. 
Branzburg was subsequently subpoenaed by a grand jury, at which he refused 
to disclose the sources' identities, disobeying a court order to divulge them. The 
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that while Kentucky's shield law might afford 
101 Branzburg v Hayes , above n 48. 
102 
Karl H Schmid "Journalists' Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of United States 
Courts of Appeals' Decisions from 1973 to 1999" (2002) 39Am Crim L Rev 1441, 1449. 
103 Sherwin, above n 30, 144. 
104 Sherwin, above n 30, 144. 
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Branzburg a privilege of withholding the identity of an informant who had 
supplied him with information, he could not claim a privilege to avoid giving 
evidence about events he had witnessed himself. 105 
Paul Pappas was a television reporter and photographer from Massachusetts 
who went to the militant civil rights group the Black Panthers' headquarters during a 
period of civil disruption to report on an expected raid. He was allowed in only on the 
condition that everything else he saw or heard would remain strictly confidential. The 
raid never happened, but Pappas wrote an article on his experiences anyway. He was 
called before a Grand Jury but refused to answer questions about what he had seen 
and heard at the headquarters. Massachusetts had no statutory shield law at the time. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said that any adverse effect on 
Pappas' ability to disseminate information by making him testify was only ·'indirect, 
theoretical, and uncertain." 106 
Earl Caldwell was a New York Times reporter covering the Black Panthers 
and other black militant groups. He was subpoenaed to hand over to the Grand Jury 
his notes and tapes of interviews with the Black Panthers. Caldwell claimed that 
forcing him to testify would drive a "wedge of distrust and silence between the news 
media and the militants." 107 
Caldwell refused to appear in court and was ordered committed for contempt. 
He appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the order. The Court said the 
First Amendment afforded a qualified testimonial privilege to newsmen, which stood 
unless there were compelling reasons for requiring his testimony. 108 
3 The Supreme Court decision 
In a 5-4 majority decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Branzburg and 
Pappas decisions and reversed the Caldwell decision. The Court said that journalists 
had the same duty to testify before a grand jury as other citizens. Any First 
Amendment interest they may have is outweighed by every citizen's general 
obligation to appear before a Grand Jury or at trial to give what information he or she 
possesses. 
105 Branzburg v Hayes, above n 48, 669. 
106 Bran=burg v Hayes, above n 48, 674. 
101 Bran=burg v Hayes, above n 48, 676. 
108 Bran=burg v Hayes , above n 48, 679. 
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The Court said its conclusion involved no restraint on what newspapers may 
publish, the quality of information journalists may seek to acquire, nor did it threaten 
the bulk of relationships between journalists and their sources. 
The different Branzburg judgments are interesting because they reflect at least 
four different approaches to the issue of journalist's privilege: 
White J gave the opinion of the Court: 109 
• There is no First Amendment privilege enabling a 
journalist to decline to appear and testify before a grand jury; 
• However, there is no obligation to disclose information 
when a Grand Jury is not acting good faith, or when a 
subpoena is used to harass a journalist or to interfere with a 
journalist's relationship with his or her source. 
Powell J concurred with the majority but produced a separate judgment: 110 
• Each case should be judged on its own merits using a 
balancing of interests approach. 
Stewart J recommended a 3-pronged approach, recognising a journalist's privilege 
b. 111 su ~ectto: 
• Whether there is probable cause the journalist has 
information relevant to a violation of the law; 
• There is no other means of obtaining the information; and 
• There is a compelling and overriding interest in the 
information 
Douglas J believed: 112 
• The First Amendment justifies an absolute journalist's 
privilege, the only exception being when the journalist is 
criminally liable. 
109 Bran::burg v Hayes, above n 48, 707-708. 
11 0 B b ran:: urg v Hayes, above n 48,710. 
111 Bran::burg v Hayes, above n 48, 743. 
11 2 B b ran:: urg v Hayes, above n 48, 712. 
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Some commentators see the White majority opinion as an expression of 
"insensitivity to the critical role of an independent press in our society," and believe 
that it is unfair to make a journalist choose between contempt and violating the ethics 
of the profession. 113 
The majority argument maintained that there was no evidence that sources will 
dry up without recognition of a journalist' s privilege. 11 4 Nor was there any reason 
why journalists should be treated any differently from other members of society in 
this context. 115 
-I The aftermath 
Not long after the Branzburg decision, 3 federal appellate courts recognised a 
constitutional privilege allowing reporters to keep their sources ' identities 
confidential. 11 6 
The Supreme Court having said that individual states remained free to enact 
their own protections for journalists as they saw fit, many legislatures sprang to enact 
their own shield laws. This was partly because of ongoing confusion about how to 
interpret Branzburg and concern about proliferation of subpoenas. However, it also 
stemmed from a general belief in the need to protect a democratic interest in the free 
flow of information as a matter of public policy. 11 7 Rather than seeing it as a matter of 
assisting law enforcement by requiring disclosure, the state legislatures ' focus was on 
protecting journalists from forced disclosure. 11 8 
Yet despite the apparent blanket refusal of the majority to condone any special 
treatment for journalists, Powell ' s concurring opinion left open the possibility to use a 
case-by-case approach which, some argue, "robbed the majority opinion of much of 
113 Erik W Laursen " Putting Journalists on Thin Ice: McKevitt v Pallasch" (2004) 73 U Cin L Rev 293 , 
300-1. 
11 4 Branzburg v Hayes, above n 48, 693. Douglas J, on the other hand believed the opposite: Bran::burg 
v Hayes, above n 48, 722 . 
115 Branzburg v Hayes , above n 48, 702 . 
11 6 Baker v F & F Inv Co (1973) 411 US 966; Bursey v United States (1972) 466 F 2d 1090; and 
Cervantes v Time Inc (1973)409 US 1125 . 
117 Laurence 8 Alexander " Looking out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting the 
Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and Information" 
(2002) 20 Yale L & Pol 'y Rev 97, 111 . 
118Alexander, above n 117, 113 . 
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its persuasive force. " 11 9 At the very least, it has led to great inconsistency in court 
decisions both between and within state jurisdictions. 
X JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
EUROPE 
A Contempt of Court Act 1981 Section 10 
In the United Kingdom, "confidentiality of itself has never been recognised as 
a ground for a valid claim of immunity." 120 
However, journalist' s privilege is dealt with under section 10 of the Contempt 
of Court Act 1981 (section 10). It provides that no court may require the media to 
disclose a source of information unless disclosure is necessary in the interests of 
justice, of national security or for prevention of disorder or crime. This rule is 
ostensibly quite generous - the default position is a rule of non-disclosure with 
limited exceptions based on necessity. However, courts in the United Kingdom have 
applied the exceptions strictly against media despite the influence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) judgments. 
The national security exception is relatively straightforward (although the 
effects of growing terrorism fears may have some impact on the application of this 
exception). So too is the exception to prevent disorder or crime, although sometimes it 
is questionable whose crime should be the focus here - the informant's, the 
journalist' s or another person' s. However, interpretations of what is in the interests of 
justice are unpredictable, and unlike the others, this exception is not also found in 
article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention). 121 
Once disclosure is found to be necessary within one of statutory exceptions, 
the journalist is at the mercy of the court ' s discretion. 122 Despite the lack of a public 
interest element, it is argued that the courts still tend to use a discretionary approach 
11 9 Sherwin, above n 30, 144. 
1'0 - Attorney-General v Clough [1963] I QB 773, 787. 
12 1 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950) 
ETS 5, art I 0( I) states that "everyone has the right to freedom of expression . This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority." 
112 X Ltd v Morgan Grampian (Publishers) Ltd , above n 97, 52. 
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overall. 123 In effect, section 10 may not have altered the balance in favour of non-
disclosure at all. 124 Furthermore, section 10 has not provided more certainty for any of 
the interested parties - even now, "different people may come to different conclusions 
on the same facts." 125 This is illustrated by the case of William Goodwin. 
B The Goodwin Case126 
William Goodwin was a trainee journalist who was contacted by an 
anonymous source and told about a company raising a multi-million pound loan 
despite being in financial difficulty. The company obtained an injunction against 
publication after Goodwin telephoned them for comment. The company said that if 
the plan was made public, there would be a complete loss of confidence in them and 
they may go into liquidation, causing hundreds of redundancies. Furthermore, they 
wanted to track down the source of the highly confidential information. 
In 1996, the House of Lords found that the importance of protecting 
Goodwin's source was diminished by the source's complicity in a gross breach of 
confidence. This was not counter-balanced by any legitimate interest in publication of 
the information. 
Goodwin refused to name the source and was fined £5000. He appealed to the 
ECHR. 
C European Union 
In its judgment, the ECHR emphasised that an order for disclosure is only 
lawful if it is justified by an overriding public interest. 127 It was undisputed that the 
disclosure order on Goodwin constituted an interference with Goodwin ' s right to 
freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Convention. The issue for the Court was 
whether this interference was justified - any interference should be in pursuance of a 
legitimate aim, be prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic society. 128 
123 Allan, above n 47, 142. 
124 Allan, above n 47, 143 . 
125 Re an Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 [ 1988] AC 660, 704 . 
116 X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian (Publishers) Ltd , above n 97. 
127 Goodwin v UK, above n 53. 
128 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, above n 121 , 
art I 0(2). 
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In deciding whether or not the interference with freedom of expression was 
proportionate to the aim to be achieved, the Court relied on fact that there had already 
been an injunction granted against publication of the information. The ECHR said that 
the main purpose of disclosing the source's identity was to prevent dissemination of 
damaging information. But these aims were not sufficient to outweigh the vital public 
interest in the protection of Goodwin's source so disclosure was not necessary in this 
case. Eleven of the eighteen judges decided that the United Kingdom had violated 
Goodwin's right to freedom of expression: 129 
Protection of journalists' sources is one of the basic conditions for press 
freedom ... Having regard to the importance of protection of journalistic 
sources for press freedom in a democratic society and the potentially 
chilling effect an order of disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom, 
such a measure cannot be compatible with Article I O of the Convention 
unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest. 
The ECHR accepted that wanting to identify the source in order to dismiss 
him or her was a relevant reason for interference with Goodwin's rights but it did not 
consider it a "sufficient" reason in itself. The ECHR jurisprudence indicates that any 
interference with freedom of expression must be proportionate to the aim sought to be 
achieved and there must be a pressing need to interfere. 130 
D Post-Goodwin Cases 
In Interbrew SA v Financial Times Ltd 131 a Belgian brewer was preparing 
highly confidential and market-sensitive documents for a possible takeover bid of 
another brewery. An unknown source allegedly doctored copies of the document and 
couriered copies to several newspapers who published the story. 132 The share prices of 
both breweries dropped alarmingly. 
Interbrew obtained an order from the High Court forcing the newspapers to 
deliver up the documents so as to identify the source and stop any further damage. 
The newspapers appealed. 
129 Goodwin v UK, above n 53 , 143. 
130 
Timothy Pinto "How Sacred is the Rule Against Disclosure of Journalists' Sources" (2003) 14(7) 
Ent L R 170. 
13 1 lnterbrew SA v Financial Times Ltd [2002] 2 Lloyd 's Rep 229. 
132 
The Times, the Guardian and Reuters were involved as well as the Financial Times. 
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The Court of Appeal held that, although it is always prima facie contrary to 
the public interest for press sources to be disclosed, it needed to ask whether there was 
an overriding public interest amounting to a pressing social need to reveal the identity 
of the source. In determining this, the purpose of leak was a crucial consideration. 
Here the leaker had a malicious purpose, and the leak was calculated to harm the 
investing public, Interbrew or both. Therefore the public interest in protecting the 
source did not outweigh Interbrew's public interest in attaining justice against the 
source. The court also said that if the source had doctored information, then this added 
weight to reasons for ordering disclosure as there is no public interest in protecting 
sources who falsify information. 133 
The newspapers refused to deliver up the documents. While they prepared an 
appeal to the House of Lords the case of Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd 
came before their Lordships. 134 The Daily Mirror published a verbatim extract of 
infamous Moors murderer and Ashworth Security Hospital (ASH) inpatient Ian 
Brady's medical records. The records had been taken from the hospital's computer 
database. 
MGN did not know the original source - it got the information from a paid 
intermediary. The parties agreed that such leaks were potentially damaging to ASH 
staff and patients alike. 
The High Court had ordered MGN to identify the intermediary on evidence 
that if that person was identified, then the original source would be too. MGN lost its 
appeal and went to the House of Lords. 
Lord Woolf acknowledged that there would be a chilling effect on freedom of 
the press if sources were scared off, and also noted the significant contribution 
confidential sources of information make to the ability of the press to perform their 
role in society. His Lordship also said that it is well established now that the courts 
will normally protect journalists' sources from identification. 135 
Nevertheless, Lord Woolf held that the facts here were exceptional (as he also 
found in Interbreiv) and justified disclosure of the intermediary's identity. 
Confidentiality of medical records, especially at ASH were of fundamental 
133 lnterbrew SA v Financial Times Ltd, above n 131, 240. 
134 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd, above n 13. 
135 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd, above n 13,210. 
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importance and disclosure of ASH patients' records was fraught with difficulty and 
danger. The source should be identified to deter others. 
MON disclosed the identity of the intermediary as freelance investigative 
journalist Robin Ackroyd, but this did not expose the original source. ASH (now 
called Mersey Care NHS Trust) applied for an order to make Ackroyd reveal his 
source. The order was granted but overturned by the Court of Appeal on the basis that 
Ackroyd had a right to his own trial and that the passage of time may have removing 
. . 1 d -C' d' l 136 any pressing soc1a nee 1or 1sc osure. 
The circumstances of these cases were seen as extraordinary althuogh it 1s 
certainly not unusual for the original source to have breached a confidence. 137 
Despite section 10 and the strong endorsement of privilege from the ECHR, it 
is clear from these cases that protection of sources in the United Kingdom is far from 
an absolute right. 138 More significantly, some commentators believe that "the law 
relating to disclosure of the identity of sources of information is no more satisfactory 
now than it was before the enactment of the Contempt of Court Act." 139 
XI JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE IN CANADA 
Canadian courts recognise a common law journalist's privilege which stands 
against the background of the Canadian Charter, 140 although the courts also consider it 
to predate the Charter. 141 
It is based on Wigmore's criteria for an evidential privilege: 142 
(a) the communication must originate in a confidence 
136 Mersey Care NHS Trust v Ackroyd [2003] EMLR 36 (CA). 
137 Floyd Abrams and Peter Hawkes " Protection of Journalists ' Sources Under Foreign and 
International Law" Media Law Resource Center Bulletin August 2004 Issue 2 190,203. 
138 Pinto, above n 130, 172. 
139 Yvonne Cripps, "Judicial Proceedings and Refusals to Disclose the Identity of Sources of 
Information" ( 1984) 43(2) CLJ 266, 267. 
14° Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Constitution Act 1982 Schedule B. Section 2(b) 
guarantees: " freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and 
other media of communication." 
141 R v Hughes(A) et al (14 July 1988) British Columbia Sup Ct Vancouver CC97 l l 80 para 54 Romilly 
J. 
142 John Henry Wigmore Evidence in Trials at Common Law ( McNaughton rev ed , Little Brown & 
Co, Boston, 1961) vol 8 §527. 
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(b) the confidence must be essential to the relationship m which the 
communication arose; and 
(c) the relationship must be one which should be 'sedulously fostered ' in the 
public good. 
The journalist-source relationship is recognised as one that should be 
fostered. 143 The courts must then consider whether the interests served by protecting 
the communications from disclosure outweigh the interests in getting at the truth and 
disposing correctly of the litigation. 144 
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that this privilege applies to journalists 
and that "it is difficult to imagine a guaranteed right more important to a democratic 
society than freedom of expression ... a democracy cannot exist without that freedom 
to express new ideas". 145 Canadian courts generally accept that a chilling effect would 
occur if these rights are not upheld. 146 However, they also understand that the rules of 
privilege work at cross-purposes to the quest for truth, so they must be very strictly 
construed and recognised only where there are important social values implicated. 147 
While "it is essential that flexibility in the balancing process be preserved so 
that all factors relevant to the individual case may be taken into consideration and 
properly weighed", 148 the requisite standard of proof is a relatively high one and it is 
based on privacy concerns as much as freedom of expression. 149 
XII JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE IN AUSTRALIA 
Australia has no federal statutory protection for journalists and protection at 
common law is minimal. 150 Australian parliaments, unlike most other liberal 
democracies, operate without a Bill of Rights that enshrines press freedoms. 
143 R v National Post, above n 45 , 444. 
144 M(A) v Ryan (1997) 143 DLR (4 th) 1,8 (SCC) McLachlin CJ. 
145 Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Attorney-General) [ I 989] I 03 AR 321, 327-328. See also Canadian 
Broadcasting Corp v New Brunswick (Attorney-Genera/) [ I 996] 3 SCR 480, 494 and Canadian 
Newspapers Co v Canada, [ 1988] 2 SCR 122, 129 . 
146 R v National Post, above n 45, 441. 
147 R v National Post, above n 45 , 443. 
148 R v National Post, above n 45 ,, 428. 
149 Abrams and Hawkes, above n 137. 
150 Nicholls v Director of Public Prosecutions [ I 99 I] 61 SASR 31, 37. 
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The government's feeling of vulnerability to terrorist attacks has also 
potentially impacted on press freedom. The Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) has a statutory power to detain and demand information from 
journalists if it relates to terrorism. 151 
New South Wales is the only Australian state with legislation providing a 
confidential relationships privilege. 152 A protected confidence is a communication 
made in the course of a relationship in which the confidant was acting in a 
professional capacity and was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose 
its contents. The court must balance matters such as the probative value of the 
evidence in the proceeding, the nature of the offence and the likelihood of harm 
ensuing to the confider in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to excuse the 
witness. The privilege applies to a journalist and source relationship. 153 
The High Court of Australia has said that "freedom of communication" 
regarding public affairs can be inferred from the concept of representative democratic 
government. 154 Nonetheless, Australian courts have long held that there are no 
pressing policy reasons for a special privilege being granted to journalists entitling 
them to refuse to disclose evidence in court simply on the ground that it would reveal 
information imparted to the journalist in confidence or because it would reveal the 
identity of an informant. 155 
The High Court of Australia applies the newspaper rule narrowly. In John 
Fairfax & Sons v Cojuango, the Court declared that "inroads into the newspaper rule 
can be justified in the interests of achieving justice between plaintiff and defendant 
when qualified privilege is in issue." 156 A judge has discretion under the newspaper 
rule to require disclosure of sources if a media defendant has a defence to a 
defamation claim and the plaintiff is seeking another defendant. 157 It is not sufficient 
151 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth) 
I st sch. The ASIO Act provides for jail terms of up to 3 years for refusing to answer questions about 
certain matters including a source's identity (exceeding the powers given in United States by the Patriot 
Act 200 I or similar United Kingdom legislation). 
152 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) Division I A. See Appendix for full text. 
153 NRMA v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 563 
154 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR I 06, 142. 
155 McGuinness v Attorney-General of Victoria, above n 78, 85-86. 
156 Tipping J, above n 67. 
157 Kerrisk v North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd [ 1992] 2 Qd R 398. Compare Hodder v Queensland 
Newspapers Pty Ltd [ 1994] I Qd R 49. 
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that the organisation is a media organisation; it is the taking of responsibility for the 
publication that makes the disclosure unnecessary. 
The Court said that the newspaper rule is merely one of practice, not of 
evidence - the rule "guides or informs the exercise of the judicial discretion". 158 
Moreover, the role of the media in collecting and disseminating information does not 
override the "paramount interest in the administration of justice which requires that 
cases be tried by the courts on the relevant and admissible evidence." 159 
The Court also showed a distinct reluctance to interpret the rule widely in the 
interests of press freedom. It noted that the newspaper rule was originally based on 
the relevance of the information but later began to be justified on freedom of 
expression grounds. 160 However, the Court rejected this justification largely because it 
could not logically be confined to defamation actions and interlocutory 
1. · 161 app 1cat10ns. 
Australian courts are generally guided by a principle of necessity (that is, 
whether disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice) in determining whether a 
journalist should be ordered to reveal the identity of a source. 162 
In 1989, Australian Sunday Times journalist Tony Barrass wrote an article 
highlighting breaches of security in the Taxation Office. He was then subpoenaed as a 
witness in a preliminary hearing against a taxation clerk accused of unauthorised 
disclosure of information. Barrass refused to answer questions about how he got his 
information. The Court held that he had no just excuse under West Australian law to 
refuse. 163 Barrass was jailed for 7 days and was both imprisoned and fined. 
In the mid-l 990s three journalists received confidential information from 
former New South Wales Judge Jim McClelland that he had perjured himself during a 
parliamentary inquiry into a former High Court judge in 1985. The Commission of 
158 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Cojuango, above n 59, 356. However, this comment is obiter since the 
case was not about interlocutory proceedings. 
159 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Cojuango, above n 59, 354. 
160 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Cojuango, above n 59, 351-353. 
161 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Cojuango, above n 59,, 353-354. 
162 John Fairfax & Sons ltdv Cojuango, above n 59,357. See also Walker, above n 7,303 . 163 DPP v luders (unreported) Court of Petty Sessions (WA), 27 November 1989, No 27602 of 1989 
(committal proceedings); DPP v luders (unreported) District Court of Western Australia, 7- 8 August 
1990, No 177 of 1990. 
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Inquiry told one of the journalists that McClelland had told another judge the same 
thing and wanted to question her; she refused to talk. 
The inquiry was terminated when McClelland died in 1999. The journalists 
subsequently released the information and were criticised for keeping it secret 
because of the severity of the wrongdoing. 164 The Media Arts and Entertainment 
Alliance changed its code after this to read: 165 
Aim to attribute information to its source. Where a source seeks anonymity, 
do not agree without first considering the source's motives and any 
alternative attributable source. Where confidences are accepted, respect them 
in all circumstances. 
Australian and New Zealand courts alike have yet to establish a truly coherent 
policy on how to deal with protection of sources. 166 
XIII JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Early Cases 
The issue of a journalist's power to protect his or her sources has seldom 
arisen in New Zealand, but the courts have long regarded the use of the discretion 
whether to require a journalists to reveal a confidential source as requiring a balancing 
exercise: 167 
The ordering of disclosure of the source of information is the exercise of 
the Court's discretionary jurisdiction, and requires a balancing of 
competing claims. Jt will never lightly be made. 
The courts have also noted "the desirability of protecting those who contribute 
[to the press] from the consequences of unnecessary disclosure of their identity." 168 
164 Morello, above n 89. 
165 
Media Arts and Entertainment Alliance " Australian Journalists ' Association Code of Ethics" 
(Redfern NSW 2003) 3. 
166 
Kelly Buchanan "Freedom of Expression and International Criminal Law: An Analysis of the 
Decision to Create a Testimonial Privilege for Journalists" (2004) 35 VU WLR 609,631 . 
167 European Pacific Banking Corporation v Fourth Estate Publications Ltd, above n 58, 136. See also 
European Pacific Banking Corporation Ltd v Television New Zealand, above n 23, 48. 
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McGuinness v Attorney-General of Victoria, above n 78, I 04, cited in Broadcasting Corporation of 
New Zealand v Alex Harvey Industries Ltd, above n 60, 165. 
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B Cara and Kelman 
Two Israeli men, Cara and Kelman, were arrested and charged after 
attempting to obtain a passport in name of a wheelchair-bound, cerebral palsy-
suffering New Zealander. 169 They were also charged with participating in an 
organised criminal group. 
The New Zealand Herald then published an article describing the men as 
"Israeli secret service agents." 170 The defendants claimed that this affected their right 
to a fair trial and issued subpoenas to three New Zealand Herald journalists who had 
quoted information from "senior government figures". 171 Potter J excused the 
journalists from giving evidence which would involve the provision of information in 
breach of confidence, saying that, in the exercise of its discretion under section 35: 172 
The Court must weigh the competing public interests in freedom of 
expression, pursuant to which the Courts have long recognised that 
sources of information accessed by the media may require protection 
otherwise the flow of information on which freedom of speech relies may 
well be curtailed or may cease; and the interest of an accused person and 
of society generally in ensuring a fair trial for those charged under the law. 
Potter J concluded that the information sought was not relevant or essential to 
ensuring a fair trial for the accused but could place at risk press freedom and that 
intervention by the Court to enforce disclosure would be a disproportionate response 
to the competing rights in the circumstances of this case. 173 
C The Ellis Case 
There appears to have been only one instance where section 389 of the Crimes 
Act 1961 has been used to gain access to the confidential information held by a writer. 
In 1998, Lynley Hood was conducting research for a book on the Christchurch Civic 
Creche child sex abuse case. 
Gay childcare worker Peter Ellis had been convicted in 1993 of sexual 
offences against several of the creche children. The case was controversial because 
169 R v Cara and Kelman, above n 25 . 
170 Bridget Carter, Tony Stickley and Eugene Bingham "Foreign Spy Charges Whip Up Top-Level 
Security Storm" ( 17 April 2004) New Zealand Herald Auckland. 
171 Carter, Stickley and Bingham , above n 170. 
172 R v Cara and Kelman, above n 25, para 35. 
173 R v Cara and Kelman, above n 25, para 43 . 
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much of the evidence came from the children themselves and there were many, 
including Lynley Hood, who doubted their reliability as witnesses. 
Hood interviewed several of the jurors in the course of her research for the 
book and also kept in touch with Ellis ' s lawyers. By September 1998, there had 
already been several appeals and Ellis ' s lawyer, Judith Ablett-Kerr was looking for 
some compelling new evidence in order to try to persuade the court to grant another 
appeal. Junior counsel Simon Barr met with Hood and they "traded gossip" about the 
jury on the understanding that the conversation was confidential. 174 
Ablett-Kerr later told Hood she wanted access to records of an interview with 
a juror mentioned in that conversation. Hood refused. However, in November 1998, 
Ablett-Kerr presented a further petition to the Governor-General which included a 
statement by Simon Barr referring to the conversation and comments made by Hood 
about the interview. Juror C was said to have told Hood that he was sexually attracted 
to one of child complainants and that he had had counselling as a consequence. 175 
The Court of Appeal made an order pursuant to section 389(a) for Hood to 
deliver up the tapes and any transcript. Hood ' s lawyers argued that the court had no 
good justification to believe that the evidence existed or if it did, that it was relevant. 
Furthermore, they argued, the Court had disregarded any privilege Hood might have. 
The Crown agreed but the Court of Appeal did not. 
In exercising its discretion under section 389, the Court of Appeal has said it 
"will normally require the establishment by an appellant of the likelihood of the 
existence of information which is cogent to the inquiry whether a miscarriage of 
justice has occurred." 176 Such discretion " is not lightly to be exercised." 177 Yet here, 
on the basis of one "gossip" session, the Court was prepared to infer that a 
miscarriage of justice may have occurred. It is difficult to see these as qualifying as 
the "rare" and '·exceptional circumstances" the Court envisaged section 389(a) as 
being limited to. 178 
174 Lynley Hood A City Possessed (Longacre Press Dunedin 200 I) 592. 
175 " Reference to the Court of Appeal of the Questions of the Convictions of Peter Hugh McGregor 
Ellis for Sexual Offences Against Children (No. 2)" MO No 54/99 (13 May 1999) New Zealand 
Ga::ette Wellington 1296. 
176 R v D (17 April 1994) AK CA 371 /95 , 4 . 
177 R v D, above n 176, 4 . 
178 R v D, above n 176, 4. 
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Hood handed over the tapes. The Court viewed them in camera and 
determined that there was nothing in them to provide an evidential foundation for the 
claims made about Juror C. 
Perhaps the court would have viewed the order differently if Hood had been a 
press journalist rather than an author. The confidentiality of either the interview or the 
conversation with Simon Barr appear not to have been major considerations. The 
rights of a criminal defendant here to gain access to information that was of dubious 
credibility and relevance to his appeal comprehensively overrode them. 
On the other hand, this was very controversial case, which garnered a great 
deal of publicity. It is arguable that the Court was under some pressure to show that it 
was giving the defence every opportunity to prove a miscarriage of justice had 
occurred, while still showing restraint towards the breach of confidentiality by 
viewing the information in camera. 
XIV PROPOSED LAW REFORM 
A Other Jurisdictions 
Thirty-one states of the United States plus the District of Columbia have 
enacted shield laws and a further seven states have recognised some form of privilege 
as a matter of state constitutional law or state common law. 179 Despite an estimated 
500 cases on journalist's privilege in the 30 years since Branzburg, there is still no 
federal shield law in the United States. 180 However, there are currently at least two 
federal shield bills before Congress, which essentially follow Douglas J's 3-pronged 
approach from Branzburg. 181 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has recommended that 
courts should have a general discretion to protect confidential communications made 
to a journalist, with the onus of proof on the person wanting the protection of the 
179 
Sager, Kellie L, Carolyn Killeen Foley, Andrew M Mar, John D Kostrey and Trinh C Tran "The 
Road Less Taken: the Path to Recognition of a Qualified Reporter's Privilege Through the Law of 
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180 
Rachel Smolkin "Under Fire: Journalists Have Been Barraged by a Spate of Subpoenas to Identify 
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clause. 182 The ALRC is currently contemplating a federal journalist's privilege as part 
of a review of evidence law in Australia. 183 
B Evidence Bill Clauses 64 and 65 
The new Evidence Bill is currently at the Select Committee stage. Clause 64 
permits a journalist who has promised confidentiality to an informant to refuse to 
answer any question or produce any document that would disclose the identity of the 
informant or enable that identity to be discovered. 184 However, under clause 64(2), a 
judge may determine that the public interest in the disclosure of evidence of the 
identity of the informant outweighs not only any likely adverse effect on the 
informant but also the inherent public interest in dissemination of information by the 
media and the media' s ability to access those sources. This seems to enable a judge to 
take into account whether sources are likely to dry up as a result of disclosure. 
An informant is defined as a person who gives information to a journalist in 
the normal course of the journalist's work in the expectation that the information may 
be published in a news medium. A news medium is a medium for the dissemination to 
the public or a section of the public of news and observations on news. Public interest 
in the disclosure of evidence includes, in a criminal proceeding, the defendant's right 
to present an effective defence. 
Clause 65 confers a general discretion on the Judge to protect confidential 
communications or information from disclosure in a proceeding if the Judge considers 
that the public interest in the disclosure in the proceeding of the communication or 
information is outweighed by the public interest in preventing harm to a person, in 
preventing harm to the special relationship between the journalist and the source or in 
182 Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, ALRC 38 ( l 987), xxi . 
183 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Uniform Evidence Acts, DP 69 (2005). The 
Australian Press Council has made a submission to the joint Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Victorian Law Reform Commission and NSW Law Reform Commission Review of the Uniform 
Evidence Acts that a provision which would be the equivalent of Division IA of the NSW Evidence 
Act l 995 and similar to that in the New Zealand Evidence Bill 2005 No 256-1 be included in the 
Uniform Evidence Acts. See <http://www.presscouncil.org.au/pcsite/fop/fop _ subs/evidence05 .html> 
(last accessed 15 September 2005). 
184 Evidence Bill 2005 no 256- l , cl 64. See Appendix for full text. 
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encouraging the free flow of information. 185 In deciding this, the judge must have 
regard to a wide range of considerations. These include: 186 
(a) the sensitivity of the evidence; 
(b) the nature of the information and its importance to the proceeding; 
(c) whether there is a less freedom-impinging way of dealing with information 
than full disclosure (such as in camera inspection by the court or name 
suppression); 
( d) whether alternative means of obtaining the information have been 
exhausted by the applicant for disclosure; 
( e) whether the proceedings are civil or criminal; 
(f) the ability to limit any disclosure; 
(g) the time elapsed since the information was given; and 
(h) the extent to which it has already been disclosed. 
C Relevant Factors For Law Reform in New Zealand 
I Necessity 
In 1994 the Law Commission suggested that, m considering legislation to 
protect journalists' sources, the starting point should be that information should not be 
disclosed unless there is "good reason" to do so. 187 The basis of most statutory 
provisions protecting journalists' sources is a presumption against disclosure unless 
an applicant can satisfy the court that it is necessary to do so - a considerably higher 
threshold. After receiving submissions, the Law Commission revised its opinion that a 
general discretion should be retained in favour of a specific qualified privilege for 
journalists' confidential sources. 188 
The necessity requirement is a useful test, since the power to convict for 
contempt is aimed at ensuring the effective administration of justice, in the interests 
of which it is appropriate that a witness should only be required to answer questions 
when justice demands it. A necessity test also conforms with other aspects of law to 
185 
Evidence Bill 2005 no 256-l , cl 65. See Appendix for full text. 
186 
New Zealand Law Commission Evidence Report 55 - Volume 1 Ref orm of the law (NZLC R55 , 
Wellington, l 999) 84 [ "Evidence Report 55 "]. 
187 Evidence Law: A Discussion Paper, above n 19, l l l . 
188
Evidence Report 55, above n 186, 83 . 
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do with conducting judicial proceedings (for example the court only allows video 
evidence when it is necessary). In addition, the necessity test provides a justifiable 
balance between the public interest in the proper administration of justice and the 
public interest in the free flow of information which revealing a source would 
facilitate. 189 
2 Codification 
There is some concern that locking the protection into a statutory framework 
may not only restrict any future development of the protection, but may also 
artificially limit the protection in unexpected ways. 19° Furthermore, any legislation 
must be concise and clearly defined, so that courts can focus on the underlying 
policies and their application to the case at hand, instead of being obliged to "engage 
in considerable semantic analysis to determine what the definition means." 191 
A complex and wordy provision is of dubious value, since "free speech rights 
repose more securely in clear standards, and press-source relationships are 
strengthened when the results of external interference with those relationships are less 
arbitrary." 192 
3 Content 
Since doubts have been expressed as to whether section 35 applies at the 
discovery stage, the Law Commission recommended clarification of the section' s 
scope. 193 While not limiting the application of the newspaper rule, it aimed to clarify 
that the general discretion applies to interlocutory proceedings as well as court 
proceedings, thus effectively subsuming the newspaper rule. 194 However, this may 
also have the unintended effect of watering down the newspaper rule, since it too 
would then become subject to the qualifications in clause 64(2). 
Although section 35(1) allows for the withholding of information received by 
a journalist and does not specify that a journalist may withhold the identity of 
informants, the Law Commission noted that this is probably not a serious omission, 
189 Walker, above n 7, 307. 
190 
See Part X A Contempt of Court Act I 981 Section I O for an analysis of the application of the way 
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smce the identity of a source is arguably "information" for the purposes of the 
provision. 195 Nonetheless, the Law Commission recommended that the ambiguity 
should be eliminated. 196 
Whereas the emphasis in section 35 was on the special relationship between 
the witness and the informant, the new clauses are not confined to that relationship. 
Clause 64 would extend the protection of information so that in some cases, a 
"relationship" of confidence between the recipient of the information and the confider 
was not necessary for protection to be granted.197 
4 Balancing Exercise 
Although its starting point is that neither journalists nor their employers will 
be compellable without the direction of the court, the Evidence Bill does not create an 
absolute privilege for journalists. Section 35(2) set out guidelines to be followed by 
the court in the exercise of its discretion. The Law Commission recommended adding 
additional matters to be considered, in view of the fact that: 198 
It is important to society that information about matters of public concern 
be disseminated, even if the price which must be paid is that full 
information may not be available to the court. A privilege serves the wider 
interest of society better than if no privilege were accorded. 
5 Burden of Proof 
The onus under the current legislation is for the party seeking to withhold the 
information to prove to the court on the balance of probabilities that it is necessary to 
do so. 199 The Law Commission has recommended that it should not be necessary in 
each case to have to establish that freedom of the press and confidentiality of sources 
are matters of public interest which deserve protection. Rather, the free flow of 
information and press freedom should be agreed to be matters of public interest. 
195 Evidence law: A Discussion Paper, above n 19, 114. 
196 Evidence law: A Discussion Paper, above n 19, 114. 
197 Evidence Report 55, above n 186, 84. 
198 Evidence law: A Discussion Paper, above n 19, 110. 
199 Evidence Law: A Discussion Paper, above n 19, 115. 
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XV DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
A Wlto is a Journalist? 
If a privilege is granted to the press, why should it not extend to others who 
perform a similar function, for example; lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, 
academic researchers or dramatists? 
The laws and policies that flow from both common law and statute protection 
for journalists tend to define them in terms of the social institution in which they 
operate and the democratic function they provide for society.200 The Evidence Bill 
defines a journalist as a person who in the normal course of that person's work may be 
given information by an informant in the expectation that the information may be 
published in a news medium. Shield laws in the United States tend to favour the large 
established organs of the press - most include a wide definition of media organisation 
but none specifically mentions the Internet. 201 The Internet would fit under the 
Evidence Bill definition of a news medium, which is wide enough to cover new types 
of media, although it might exclude non-commercial journalists. 
Does this mean someone who runs a web log is covered? Should a student 
reporter on a student newspaper be eligible for the privilege? What about a writer of 
non-fiction? 
I Bloggers 
"If newspapers are symphonies, bloggers are jazz. The American press is 
returning to its pre-professionalized past; more jazz and less symphony."202 Even the 
Branzburg majority spared a sympathetic thought for the " lonely pamphleteer",203 of 
which the blogger is arguably the 21 st century equivalent. However, there is a danger 
that the broader the class of people claiming protection, the more likely the courts will 
be to back off from granting special privileges. One current Senate bill for a federal 
shield law includes bloggers under the definition of journalist while another one 
doesn' t.204 Commentators believe the latter is more likely to go ahead.205 
200 Alexander, above n 117, IOI. 
20 1 Alexander, above n 117, 116-118. 
202 Kirtz, above n 86. 
203 Branzburg v Hayes , above n 48 , 704. 
204 Free Speech Protection Act of 2004 and Freedom of Information Act of 2005 , above n 181. The 
Free Speech Protection Act of 2004 would protect anyone gathering news, while the Freedom of 
Information Act of2005 excludes those who publish solely on the Web. 
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Alternatively, judges may simply seek ways to avoid dealing with issue 
altogether. In 2004 Apple fan chat rooms leaked information about an upcoming 
Apple device. Apple subpoenaed the bloggers, who claimed privilege under 
California's shield law. The judge sidestepped the issue of deciding whether bloggers 
were in fact journalists by saying that the leaks involved trade secrets so they could 
not be protected. 206 
The question also arose in Blumenthal v Drudge.207 Blogger Matt Drudge 
claimed in his biog that White House Special Assistant Sidney Blumenthal had 
abused his wife. Although Drudge retracted the story the next day, Blumenthal sued 
him. Drudge claimed journalist's privilege under the First Amendment, but the court 
said that: "Drudge is not a reporter, journalist or a newsgatherer. He is, as he himself 
admits, simply a purveyor of gossip."208 Oddly, however, the matter was finally 
settled on the basis that Blumenthal did not raise any grounds to nullify a privilege.209 
2 Students 
United States shield laws usually do not distinguish between types of writers 
but focus on the activities performed, so unpaid volunteers would often be covered.2 10 
Some states limit the scope of the law by strictly defining the range of publications 
that are included; for example, by requiring a paid circulation or by excluding 
publications which have been running for less than one year.211 
While student journalists could arguably be covered under the Evidence Bill, 
there seems no justification to extend the scope to students in general. The same 
would no doubt be true in the United States where a graduate student unsuccessfully 
tried to claim "scholar's privilege" against divulging research obtained from 
confidential sources regarding vandalism at a university animal testing laboratory.212 
205 Kirtz, above n 86. 
206 Apple Computer Inc v Doe I (2005) 33 Media L Rep 1449. 
207 Blumenthal v Drudge ( 1998) 992 F Supp 44. 
208 Blumenthal v Drudge, above n 207, 57. 
209 Blumenthal v Drudge ( 1999) 186 FRO 236. 
210 Alexander, above n 117, 116. 
211 Alexander, above n 117, 117. 
212 In re Grand Jury Proceedings ( 1993) 5 F 3d 397, 400 (9th Cir). 
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3 Authors 
Many journalists also write books and many authors write in a journalistic 
style about topical issues. The Evidence Bill would cover these writers as long as the 
information is obtained in confidence and produced in the expectation of publication. 
In van Bulow by Auersperg v van Bulow,213 a writer was subpoenaed as a third 
party in a civil lawsuit for investigative reports commissioned by her, notes taken 
during a trial and the manuscript of her unpublished book. The court held that all the 
information could have been covered by privilege, but she did not qualify because at 
the time she obtained the information she was not intending to disseminate it to the 
bl . 214 pu IC. 
Author and lecturer Vanessa Leggett was jailed for contempt in Texas in 2001 
after refusing to hand over her notes from an interview with a convicted murderer 
who committed suicide. Leggett was writing a book about the murder. The court was 
disinclined to extend privilege to a "virtually unpublished freelance writer, operating 
without an employer or a contract for publication", and in any case the privilege could 
not defeat a grand jury subpoena. 215 
An author such as Lynley Hood in her role as author of the Peter Ellis book 
would probably come under the scope of Clause 64, since she was acting in the 
normal course of her work and it was a topical issue. However, the impact of the 
journalist's privilege on section 389 of the Crimes Act may be negligible. A judge in 
a criminal proceeding may well conclude that if section 389 is applicable, in that the 
information is relevant, then the privilege has already been outweighed, especially 
since the information need only be "expedient in the interests of justice."216 
A more useful definition of journalists might focus on what they do, which is 
to foster democratic dialogue, rather than by what they are (the people's watchdog).217 
After all, "what makes journalism journalism is not its format but its content,"218 and, 
213 
Von Bulow by Auersperg v van Bulow ( 1987) 811 F 2d 136 (2nd Cir). 
214 
Compare Shoen v Shoen (1995) 48 F 3d 412 (9 th Cir) where "an investigative author of books on 
topical and controversial subjects" was able to claim privilege because he began collecting information 
with the intention of producing a book. 
215 
Alexander, above n 117, 119 (footnote in original) . 
216 Crimes Act 1961 s389. 
217 Alexander, above n 117, I 05 . 
218 
Heather Stamp "McKevitt v Pallasch: How the Ghosts of the Branzburg Decision are Haunting 
Journalists in the 7
th 
Circuit" (2004) 14 De Paul LCA J Art & Ent Law 363,390 (footnote in original). 
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as one commentator has pointed out, it would be absurd if Bob Woodward were 
protected in his capacity as a Washington producer but not as the author of "All the 
President's Men."219 In any case, it is important to clarify the boundaries of the 
d fi . . · 220 e m1tlon, smce: 
The advent of inexpensive desktop and on line publishing have contributed 
to the creation of classes of persons who do not earn their livings as 
journalists, but who participate in many of the same information gathering 
functions as . .. traditional journalists. 
There is a real danger, moreover, that broadening the scope of the protection 
too much would devalue it: 221 
So many divergent groups of persons could be called journalists that the 
protection of the privilege would be dissolved .. . Such expansion runs 
counter to the fundamental notion of a privilege, which should be 
maintained for a select, well-defined group to the exclusion of all others. 
It will eventually be up to the courts to determine how far the definition 
extends, but "the smaller and more identifiable the class of persons able to assert the 
privilege, the easier it will be to sustain this protection for journalists."222 
B What is a Source? 
Journalist's privilege under the Evidence Bill applies only to confidential 
communications between a journalist and an informant. 
The privilege belongs to the journalist; it cannot be asserted independently by 
an informant. 223 Arguably, then, the lack of a promise of confidentiality should not 
make any difference to the application of the privilege, since "people cannot waive 
privileges that are not theirs to claim" .224 At any rate, an informant's control over 
what is done with any information he or she imparts is strictly limited. 
Under the section 35 discretion, a confidence could be said to exist 
independently of any specific agreement of confidentiality, because of the special 
219 Kraig L Baker " Are Oliver Stone and Tom Clancy Journalists? Determining Who Has Standing to 
Claim the Journalist's Privilege" (1994) 69 Washington Law Review 739, 753. 
220 Alexander, above n 117, 99 . 
22 1 Alexander, above n 117, IOI. 
222 Alexander, above n 117, IOI. 
223 Bran::burg v Hayes, above n 48, 693 ; United States v Cuthbertson (1980) 630 F 2d 139, 147 (3 rd 
Cir) . 
224 Laursen, above n 113,316. 
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relationship that is created. A confidence anses whether there has been a promise 
made or not. There is perhaps more scope under this discretion for non-confidential 
information to be protected from disclosure . 
At international criminal law, a privilege exists for war correspondents which 
does not distinguish between confidential and non-confidential information.225 This is 
understandable, due to the patiicular dangers and difficulties related to war reporting 
and the importance of encouraging the free flow of information about events that 
occur during conflicts. The arguments are not so clear-cut regarding domestic law. 
Most subpoenas issued against the press in the United States are for non-
confidential information.226 The United States jurisprudence is mixed on the matter of 
whether a journalist's privilege ought to apply to non-confidential communications. 
All subpoenas compromise the autonomy of the media, if not the free flow of 
information, so the amount of protection that non-confidential information should 
have is an important issue. In United States v Smith the court said that there was "little 
reason to fear that on-the-record sources will avoid the press simply because the 
media might tum over non-confidential statements to the government" and presumed 
that sources "expect beforehand that the government, along with the rest of the public, 
will view their non-confidential statements when they are aired by the media."227 
Some cases do not differentiate between confidential & non-confidential sources,228 
while some give a lesser degree of protection to non-confidential sources. 229 
225 The Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talic (Judgment) (7 June 2002) IT-99-36-T (Trial Chamber II, 
ICTY); TheProsecutor v Brdjanin and Talic (Judgment) (11 December 2002) IT-99-36-AR73.9 
(Appeals Chamber, ICTY). 
226 Dalglish, above n 39, 8. 
227 United States v Smith (1998) 135 F 3d 963 , 970 (5 th Cir) (arson suspect volunteered television 
interview) . 
228 Lewis v United States (1974) 50 I F 2d 418 (9th Cir); Lewis v United States ( 1975) 517 F 2d 236(9 th 
Cir) (anonymous packages delivered to a radio station); United States v Criden ( 1980) 633 F 2d 346 
(3 rd Cir) (government sources gave information to the media regarding fraud charges against an 
attorney);United States v Cuthbertson , above n 223 (fast-food franchise owners indicted for fraud and 
conspiracy wanted tapes and notes from 60 Minutes report ); van Bulow by Auersperg v van Bulow 
( I 987) 811 F 2d 136, 145 (2nd Cir) ( civil litigant wanted investigation reports, notes from a trial and a 
book manuscript from a writer not a party in the case) . 
229 United States v LaRouche Campaign ( 1988) 841 F 2d 1176, 1181 ( I st Cir) (presidential campaign 
employee gave television interview about the candidate); Shoen v Shoen, above n 214 (two sons suing 
father for libel relating to non-confidential statements made to the author of a book about them being 
involved in murder of a third son); Gonzales v National Broadcasting Company ( 1999) 194 F 3d 29 
(2nd Cir) (Gonzales had a federal civil rights action against a deputy sheriff for uncalled-for traffic stops 
and wanted outtakes from a Dateline programme to show racial bias). 
52 
On the face of it, non-confidential information seems less deserving of 
protection than confidential information: it is difficult to see how failing to protect 
non-confidential information might impact upon the free flow of information.230 
Furthermore, extending the scope of the privilege may have the unintended effect of 
watering down its strength; courts may be reluctant to enforce a sweeping privilege 
leading to unpredictable outcomes.23 1 On the other hand, the press should not be 
coerced into acting as an investigative arm for civil litigants or criminal prosecutors 
and defendants . 232 There may indeed be: 233 
A lurking and subtle threat to journalists and their employers of disclosure 
if outtakes, notes and other unused information, even if non-confidential, 
becomes routinely and casually, if not cavalierly, compelled. 
If non-confidential materials are always compellable, there could be a "ripple effect" 
which means that they are always compelled without examining the circumstances of 
the case.234 This could lead to journalists adopting new practices to avoid being 
compelled, such as limiting investigative work or avoiding controversial stories. 
It makes sense, therefore, to treat each case on its own merits, rather than to 
implement a strict rule ; a lack of confidentiality should be relevant in the balance but 
not determinative. After all, "If the same [press freedom] interests are implicated 
when both confidential and non-confidential information is subpoenaed, then why 
2r does the same test not apply?" ) 
C How Much is Covered? 
New Zealand courts have defined sources as more than just names of 
informants - sources can include interviews, notes of interviews and more.236 
Arguably, "everything from gossip or rumour to hard news is part of the information 
flow that people rely on in order to create a bridge between themselves and 
society."237 Even seemingly frivolous information can have important political 
230 Anthony L Fargo "The Journalist ' s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States Without 
Shield Laws" (2002) 7 Comm L & Pol ' y 24 I, 253 . 
231 Zampa, above n 44 , 1453 . 
232 Fargo, above n 230, 272. 
233 United States v laRouche Campaign, above n 229. 
234 Elrod, above n 8, 163 . 
235 Anthony L Fargo " Reconsidering The Federal Journalist's Privilege For Non-Confidential 
Information: Gonzales v NBC" (200 I) 19 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 355 , 386-387. 
236 Brill v Television Service One, above n 61 , 688 . 
237 Elrod, above n 8, 161. 
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ramifications; for example, the Clinton-Lewinsky saga began as mere gossip but 
escalated into a presidential impeachment issue. Since it is virtually impossible to 
predict the potential impact of information, a broad range of communications deserves 
protection: "the liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. The 
press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a 
vehicle of information and opinion."238 
The Evidence Bill grants journalists the power to refuse to answer questions or 
produce documents that would identify a confidential informant.239 Therefore it 
would not generally include a journalist' s visual observations during a confidential 
interview or notes about an interview that may be sensitive but would not identify the 
informant. 
D What Standard Should be Applied? 
Protection under the Evidence Bill applies to both criminal and civil 
proceedings and extends to both the identity of the informant and any information that 
would identify the informant or enable the informant to be identified. This is a high 
threshold; a determination must be made that disclosure would in fact identify the 
informant. A strict rule may be appropriate in criminal cases, where the information 
may, for example, affect an accused' s defence. However, in civil cases, it seems 
more fitting to estimate whether, on the balance of probabilities, the information is 
likely to identify the source. 
On the other hand, a privilege is not granted lightly. It may be more practical 
for the same standard to apply in both civil and criminal proceedings in the interests 
of regularity and predictability. 
Changing the rule from one of a general discretion to excuse a journalist 
witness under section 35 to a fundamental one of non-compellability certainly 
clarifies and tidies up the law. Parties in both civil and criminal actions will know 
where they stand, and there will be less incentive for litigants to embark on fishing 
expeditions for evidence. However, whether it is the best way to protect journalists ' 
confidential sources remains to be seen. 
238 Lovell v City of Griffin ( l 938) 303 US 323 , 331 . 
239 Evidence Bill 2005 , above n 6, cl 64(1). 
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XVI WHICH WAY FOR NEW ZEALAND? 
Do shield laws really work and are they necessary to ensure protection of 
confidentiality? It is not easy to assess the degree to which the protection of sources 
promotes the free flow of information nor to determine how much limiting that 
protection might impact on the availability of information.240 However, the threat of 
subpoenas has caused many United States news organisations to institute policies of 
non-retention of information.24 1 
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press have conducted regular 
surveys on subpoenaing of the news media since 1997. In the United States in 2001 , 
the average news organisation received 2.6 subpoenas ( compared with 3 in 1999 and 
4.6 in 1997).242 Whereas in shield law states 22 per cent of subpoenas are quashed, 
elsewhere the rate is 5 per cent. 243 A 1995 nationwide United States study found that 
newspapers in states with shield laws publish more investigative reports and win more 
national and regional awards for their reporting than their counterparts in non-shield-
law states.244 One hundred editors in forty-eight states were surveyed and the 
evidence pointed to the conclusion that shield laws do indeed have a positive impact 
· · · · 245 on mvestigative reportmg. 
Judges in states with shield laws are four times more likely to quash a 
subpoena against a media representative than those in states without them.246 The 
mere existence of such a law can give judges a tool to discourage lawsuits against the 
press. But it is likely that the more journalists who face jail for refusing to disclose 
their sources, the more aggressive will be legal demands that they reveal them. The 
issue is a topical one in the United States, but it has arisen so rarely in New Zealand 
that it is too difficult to predict the impact of a statutory journalist's privilege on 
demands on journalists for confidential information. 
240 Moysa v Albert (Labour Relations Board) [ 1989] 1 SCR 1572, 1581. 
24 1 Dalglish, above n 39, 12 . 
242 Dalglish, above n 39, 6. 
243 Dalglish, above n 39, 11 . 
244 Eileen Wirth " Impact of State Shie ld Laws on Investigative Reporting" (1995) 16(3) Newspaper 
Res J 64 [" Impact of State Shield Laws on Investigative Reporting"] . 
245 Wirth " Impact of State Shield Laws on Investigative Reporting", above n 244. 
246 Zelnick, above n 46, 549 . 
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XVII CONCLUSION 
Journalists act as watchdogs against abuses of official power and as a check on 
all branches of government. They are the conduit of the people to information about 
all the things that affect daily life - from national politics to neighbourhood news. In 
the course of accessing information, journalists will inevitably be put in the position 
of receiving sensitive information from sources who wish their identities to be kept 
secret. The essential dichotomy of the journalist' s job is that, in the interest of 
disseminating important information, he or she must agree to withhold a part of that 
information. Our common law already recognises that this is sometimes in the public 
interest; it is the essence of the newspaper rule. Journalist witnesses are not in the 
same position as any other citizen called to give evidence; like lawyers, doctors and 
priests, journalists will lose the ability to function effectively if people cannot trust 
them to keep their promises of confidentiality. 
New Zealand courts have not yet had to deal with a Judith Miller-type 
contempt case, but if a journalist here refused to obey a similar order, the result would 
probably be the same. In making the order in the first place, however, the courts here 
already recognise the value of protecting journalist's sources and they have a wide 
discretion under current law to consider a broad range of factors. 
As stated in Branzburg, anything less than an absolute privilege cannot be 
completely relied on for protection. Enacting a complex and significantly qualified 
form of privilege that will rarely be invoked may not be worth the uncertainties of 
definition and application that will inevitably arise. The broadly interpreted 
exceptions to section 10 m the United Kingdom have largely diffused the 
effectiveness of the privilege. Journalist's privilege is "a complicated myriad of 
theories, arguments, statutes and judicial decisions, varying from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction and fact situation to fact situation."247 
Although it should be acknowledged that there is a strong public interest in 
permitting journalists to withhold information about their sources, a balanced 
approach which looks at all the relevant factors in each case should, in the end, bring 
about the most equitable result. 
247 Sherwin above n 30, 138. 
56 
APPENDIX 
Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 Section 35: 
(1) In any proceeding before any Court, the Court may, in its discretion, excuse any 
witness (including a party) from answering any question or producing any document 
that he would otherwise be compellable to answer or produce, on the ground that to 
supply the information or produce the document would be a breach by the witness of 
a confidence that, having regard to the special relationship existing between him and 
the person from whom he obtained the information or document and to the matters 
specified in subsection (2) of this section, the witness should not be compelled to 
breach. 
(2) In deciding any application for the exercise of its discretion under subsection (1) 
of this section, the Court shall consider whether or not the public interest in having the 
evidence disclosed to the Court is outweighed, in the particular case, by the public 
interest in the preservation of confidences between persons in the relative positions of 
the confidant and the witness and the encouragement of free communication between 
such persons, having regard to the following matters: 
(a) The likely significance of the evidence to the resolution of the issues to be decided 
in the proceeding; 
(b) The nature of the confidence and of the special relationship between the confidant 
and the witness; and 
(c) The likely effect of the disclosure on the confidant or any other person. 
(3) An application to the Court for the exercise of its discretion under subsection (1) 
of this section may be made by any party to the proceeding, or by the witness 
concerned, at any time before the commencement of the hearing of the proceeding or 
at the hearing. 
(4) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall derogate from any other privilege or 
from any discretion vested in the Court by any other provision of this Act or of any 
other enactment or rule of law. 
(5) In this section "Court" includes -
(a) Any tribunal or authority constituted by or under any Act and having power to 
compel the attendance of witnesses; and 
(b) Any other person acting judicially. 
Crimes Act 1961 Section 389 
For the purposes of any appeal or application for leave to appeal against conviction or 
sentence the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court may, if it thinks it necessary or 
expedient in the interests of justice,-
(a)Order the production of any docwnent, exhibit, or other thing connected with the 
proceedings the production of which appears to the Court to be necessary for the 
determination of the case; 
(b )If it thinks fit , order any witnesses who would have been compellable witnesses at 
the trial to attend and be examined before the Court, whether they were or were not 
called at the trial , or order the exan1ination of any such witnesses to be conducted in 
manner provided by rules of Court before any Judge of the Court or before any officer 
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of the Court or District Court Judge or other person appointed by the Court of Appeal 
or the Supreme Court for the purpose, and allow the admission of any depositions so 
taken as evidence before the Court; 
( c )If it thinks fit, receive the evidence, if tendered, of any witness (including the 
appellant) who is a competent but not compellable witness, and, if the appellant 
makes an application for the purpose, of the husband or wife of the appellant, in cases 
where the evidence of the husband or wife could not have been given at the trial 
except on such application; 
(d)Where any question arising on the appeal involves prolonged examination of 
documents or accounts, or any scientific or local investigation, which cannot in the 
opinion of the Court conveniently be conducted before the Court, order the reference 
of the question in manner provided by rules of Court for inquiry and report to a 
special commissioner appointed by the Court, and act upon the report of any such 
commissioner so far as the Court thinks fit to adopt it; 
( e )Appoint any person with special expert knowledge to act as assessor to the Court 
in any case where it appears to the Court that such special knowledge is required for 
the proper determination of the case-
and exercise in relation to the proceedings of the Court any other powers which may 
for the time being be exercised by the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court on 
appeals in civil matters, and issue any warrants necessary for enforcing the orders or 
sentences of the Court 
Provided that in no case shall any sentence be increased by reason of or in 
consideration of any evidence that was not given at the trial. 
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) Division JA Section 126A 
In this Division, protected confidence means: 
(a) a communication made by a person in confidence to another person (in this section 
called the confidant) acting in a professional capacity and who, when the 
communication was made, was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose 
its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law or can be inferred from the 
nature of the relationship between the person and the confidant, or 
(b) the contents of a document relating to a communication of a kind referred to in 
paragraph (a), or 
( c) information about, or enabling a person to ascertain, the identity of the person who 
made a communication of a kind referred to in paragraph (a) known by the confidant. 
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) Division JA Section 126B 
Exclusion of evidence of protected confidences: 
(1) The court may direct that evidence not be adduced in a proceeding if the court 
finds that adducing it would disclose a protected confidence. 
(2) The court may give such a direction: 
(a) on its own initiative, or 
(b) on the application of the protected confider or confidant concerned (whether or not 
either is a party). 
(3) The court must give such a direction if it is satisfied that: 
(a) if the evidence is adduced it is likely that harm would or might be caused (whether 
directly or indirectly) to a protected confider, and 
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(b) the nature and extent of the harm outweighs the desirability of the evidence being 
given. 
( 4) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account for the purposes 
of this section, it is to take into account the following matters: 
(a) the importance of the evidence in the proceeding, 
(b) the nature and gravity of the relevant offence, cause of action or defence and the 
nature of the subject matter of the proceeding, 
( c) the availability of any other evidence concerning the matters to which the 
protected confidence relates, 
( d) the likely effect of adducing evidence of the protected confidence, including the 
likelihood of harm, and the nature and extent of harm, that would be caused to the 
protected confider, 
( e) the means available to the court to limit the harm or extent of the harm that is 
likely to be caused if evidence of the protected confidence is disclosed, 
(f) if the proceeding is a criminal proceeding--whether the party seeking to adduce 
evidence of the protected confidence is a defendant or the prosecutor, 
(g) whether the substance of the protected confidence has already been disclosed by 
the protected confider or any other person. 
(5) The court must state its reasons for refusing to give a direction under this section. 
Evidence Bill 2005 Clause 64 
(1) If a journalist has promised an informant not to disclose the informant's identity, 
neither the journalist nor his or her employer is compellable in a civil or criminal 
proceeding to answer any question or produce any document that would disclose the 
identity of the informant or enable that identity to be discovered. 
(2) A Judge of the High Court may order that subsection (1) is not to apply if satisfied 
by a party to a civil or criminal proceeding that, having regard to the issues to be 
determined in that proceeding, the public interest in the disclosure of evidence of the 
identity of the informant outweighs-
(a) any likely adverse effect of the disclosure on the informant or any other person; 
and 
(b) the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public by the 
news media and, accordingly also, in the ability of the news media to access sources 
of facts. 
(3) The Judge may make the order subject to any terms and conditions that the Judge 
thinks appropriate. 
( 4) This section does not affect the power or authority of the House of 
Representatives. 
Evidence Bill 2005 Clause 65 
( 1) A direction under this section is a direction that any 1 or more of the following not 
be disclosed in a proceeding: 
(a) a confidential communication: 
(b) any confidential information: 
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( c) any information that would or might reveal a confidential source of information. 
(2) A Judge may give a direction under this section if the Judge considers that the 
public interest in the disclosure in the proceeding of the communication or 
information is outweighed by the public interest in-
( a) preventing harm to a person by whom, about whom, or on whose behalf the 
confidential information was obtained, recorded, or prepared or to whom it was 
communicated; or 
(b) preventing harm to-
(i) the particular relationship in the course of which the confidential communication 
or confidential information was made, obtained, recorded, or prepared; or 
(ii) relationships that are of the same kind as, or of a kind similar to, the relationship 
referred to in subparagraph (i) ; or 
( c) maintaining activities that contribute to or rely on the free flow of information. 
(3) When considering whether to give a direction under this section, the Judge must 
have regard to-
( a) the likely extent of harm that may result from the disclosure of the communication 
or information; and 
(b) the nature of the communication or information and its likely importance in the 
proceeding; and 
( c) the nature of the proceeding; and 
( d) the availability or possible availability of other means of obtaining evidence of the 
communication or information; and 
( e) the availability of means of preventing or restricting public disclosure of the 
evidence if the evidence is given; and 
(f) the sensitivity of the evidence, having regard to-
(i) the time that has elapsed since the communication was made or the 
information was compiled or prepared; and 
(ii) the extent to which the information has already been disclosed to other 
persons; and 
(g) society's interest in protecting the privacy of victims of offences and, in particular, 
victims of sexual offences. 
(4) The Judge may, in addition to the matters stated in subsection (3), have regard to 
any other matters that the Judge considers relevant. 
(5) A Judge may give a direction under this section that a communication or 
information not be disclosed whether or not the communication or information is 
privileged by another provision of this subpart or would, except for a limitation or 
restriction imposed by this subpart, be privileged. 
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